The Early Church and Peter's Primacy

Letter V, Fourth Roman Synod (Synodus Palmaris) of 23 October 501

Synopsis: Acts of the fourth synod of 501 absolving Pope Symmachus of the charges brought by the Laurentian faction, on the principle that the case of the Apostolic See is reserved to divine judgment alone.

Translator’s note: The Latin of this synodal document is, even by Thiel’s standards, unusually compressed and difficult — particularly in sections 7 through 9, where the original passes through long periodic constructions and dense ablative absolutes. Readers consulting the document for technical theological or canonical purposes should compare it against the Latin in Thiel’s edition (pp. 657–670) where the precise wording matters. The synod’s date is given as 23 October 501 following Thiel’s edition and the Cardinals’ biographical record; some older Catholic encyclopedic sources give the date as 23 October 502, reflecting different chronologies for the four synods of the Symmachan schism.

The fourth synod held at Rome on the absolution of Pope Symmachus.

Chapter I: The Convocation, and the Bishops’ Recognition That the Pope’s Case Was Without Precedent

1. With Rufius Magnus Faustus Avienus, the most distinguished man, consul, on the tenth day before the Kalends of November, the holy synod, gathered at the city of Rome from various regions by the precept of the most glorious King Theodoric, said in the name of Christ:

The most glorious king had ordered bishops to come together at Rome from various provinces, that the holy council might investigate the matters which the adversaries of the venerable Pope Symmachus, prelate of the Apostolic See, claimed could be charged against him. The bishops of Liguria, Aemilia, and the Venetian regions, whom the king had drawn into his presence on his journey, had to consult him — broken by age, weak in body, in poor health, and reluctant to be assembled. The most pious king responded with his characteristic goodwill: that many grave reports concerning Pope Symmachus’s conduct had been brought to him, and that, if the objections of his enemies were true, this needed to be made manifest by the synod’s judgment.

2. The bishops, on whom the burden of presenting the case now lay, observed that the one accused ought himself to convoke the synod — knowing that to his See belongs first the merit and primacy of the Apostle Peter, and then the authority of the venerable councils, following the Lord’s command, has handed down a singular power in the churches. They observed too that no precedent had ever been laid down in any similar form, by which the prelate of the said See should subject himself to the judgment of those of lesser rank. But the king most strongly indicated that the Pope himself had also expressed his will to convoke the synod by letters. The requests put forward in the king’s communication were answered by his clemency. He directed the bishops to act without delay, either to give a ruling in the matter or to do whatever the case required; and so the bishops gathered at Rome from various parts of lands and regions by God’s providential prosecution of the matter.

Chapter II: Symmachus Comes to the Synod and Asks Procedural Restoration Before Hearing

3. While the venerable assembly was discussing how to begin the case, Pope Symmachus entered the basilica of Julius, where the bishops were gathered in session. He gave thanks to the most clement king for the synodal convocation and testified that this matter — for which he had hoped — had now come to pass. The cause of the bishops’ uncertainty, which had kept the council unsettled, was now removed: he professed that he gave his presence to the gathering, in keeping with the order required by the ecclesiastical statutes, before all who had come together there. He hoped, on attending the synod, that whatever had been petitioned against him by certain clergy or laymen — contrary to the reverence owed to the older statutes, or contrary to the rules of the greater part — would be reviewed; and that all things which had been taken from him by the suggestions of his enemies would, by the honorable council’s ordination, be restored to his power. He asked that the prelate of so great a place might first be lawfully restored to his original estate, and only then come to the case and respond to the accusers’ propositions if the synod thought it proper.

Chapter III: The Royal Order Requiring Symmachus to Engage With Accusers Before Restoration

4. The matter seemed worthy to most of the bishops to be granted. But the synod did not presume to decree anything without the king’s notice. Owing to the legates’ negligence in delivering the request, the just suggestion did not receive the response it deserved. Pope Symmachus was instead ordered by royal commands to engage with his accusers concerning the patrimonial and ecclesiastical questions before having those things he had lost restored to him. Pope Symmachus had submitted the privileges of his power — for the satisfaction of conscience, as We justly estimate — and on this occasion he did not wish to take them up again.

Chapter IV: The Sessorian Synod Refuses Charges Brought Through the Pope’s Slaves

5. While the synod was meeting at the Sessorian basilica — known by the byname Hierusalem — certain bishops thought that the libellus prepared by the accusers — which they were daily pressing in seditious assemblies — should be received by the synod. But this libellus contained two things which were either inimical to truth or, as the proceedings showed, repugnant to the assembly’s ecclesiastical purpose. First, the accusers claimed that the charges against Pope Symmachus had previously come to royal notice. The Pope declared this false: he would not have committed the matter to a hearing as if it were a new cause, if he knew his own conscience to be convicted of error and were merely awaiting sentence. Second, the accusers were attempting to bring charges against him through his own slaves, claiming that they could convict him by their testimony, and demanding that he hand the slaves over to them, by whom they asserted he could be defeated in judgment. This was contrary both to the canons and to the public laws — for the statutes of the Fathers had laid down that those whom the laws of the world do not admit as accusers should be denied any license either of speaking or of pursuing in cognizance.

Chapter V: The Pope’s Procession to the Synod Is Attacked by Mob Violence

6. While these matters were being treated, the Pope arrived to plead his case. Coming through the hostile crowds of his violent rivals, he was so handled that the count Arigernus, an illustrious man, came near to losing his life in the attack — along with many of the presbyters who were going with him. The still-recent traces of the wounds of the most illustrious count Arigernus, and of the eminent men Gudila and Bedeulfus — the chief officers of the royal household — bore witness to where the Pope had set out from, when he made his way to the precincts of the blessed Apostle Peter.

Chapter VI: The Bishops Petition the King Again; Symmachus Reserves His Canonical Standing

7. With these things done and the proceedings in confusion, We turned again to the king’s justice — knowing that God’s own divine providence rules the lord whom He has provided for the very governance of Italy. We approached his clemency in the order required by the case, and conveyed also the answer of the often-named Pope. The Pope, after the violent assault to which he and his clergy had been subjected, had been admonished to come out again to the judgment if he had the will to do so. But through the bishops he sent with this mandate, he replied: that he had ceded to the canons; that, while seeking to humble himself in the culmination of his own purgation, by what great perils he had nearly been overwhelmed! The lord the king had the power to do whatever he wished; he himself, however, in the meantime — justice not refusing — could not be compelled by the canonical statutes themselves.

Chapter VII: The King Returns the Substantive Question to the Synod’s Judgment

8. To these things the most serene king responded, as God breathed upon him: that the synodal arbitrement was, in this great matter, to follow what was prescribed by ecclesiastical custom, and that nothing beyond reverence for ecclesiastical affairs pertained to him — committing also to the pontifical power that, whether the bishops wished to hear the matter or not, they should deliberate on what they thought more useful, provided only that, by the venerable provision of the council, peace in the Roman city should be restored to all Christians; for when this is justly offered, the mandates of God are fulfilled, and Italy is given her own rector.

Chapter VIII: The Synod Reserves the Pope’s Case to Divine Judgment

9. Recognizing that no further labor remained for Us — except to exhort the dissidents, in the humility of Our purpose, to concord — for the one thing remaining in this great matter, by which We might obey both God and the holy king’s will, was to invite the most ample senate by the assembled legation. We admonished and instructed the senate as was fitting: that the causes of God Himself are to be committed to His judgment — He who is able to slay the body and send the soul into Gehenna (Luke 12:5), He who says, Vengeance is Mine, and I will repay (Rom. 12:19; Heb. 10:30); before whom conscience is naked, from whom hidden things are not concealed. Prudent men should consider how inconveniently and prejudicially this matter had befallen Us at its outset — and that We were not, by what the accusers themselves were demanding, opening the remission of sins to the impugners but rather closing it; that We reserve what is being said for the greater judgment, instructing the senators that, since Christ has been made known to them through Us, foreseeing the snares of the wolf is the work of the shepherd, not of the sheep; especially in a matter in which, where many have alleged so much, the accusers were disdaining to acknowledge their fault and satisfy God, in whom error had involved them.

For the synod could not, on this occasion, drive further members from the Church, but had rather to sustain them through gentleness — as Paul instructed Us in good work, saying that many are to be sustained through patience and doctrine. Even those thought guilty and entangled in grave sins — and there is no one without fault, as John the apostle attests, If I shall say that I have no sin, I am a liar (1 John 1:8) — are rather to be sustained by human pressures and gravely admonished, with their offenses suspended for divine judgment. This is especially the case when, among the things We have premised, the principles concerning the See’s authority itself rule out any other course: because what its possessor once Blessed Peter merited has acceded to the See by the nobility of the possession, and Christ’s gift gives the ancient brightness to its rectors. This the prophet proclaims, speaking in God’s person: Will not my hand be upon them and consume those who have erred? (Isa. 50:2)

Chapter IX: The Synod’s Decree of Absolution

10. By these allegations protested before God, We decree — bound by these necessities and religious considerations, and all heavenly things weighed which were in the case, by the inspiration of the heavenly secret: Pope Symmachus, prelate of the Apostolic See, has been impugned by these accusations — but, to the extent the matter pertains to men, because all the obstructions designated above prevent any human determination, the case is established to have been dismissed by divine judgment. Let him be free and immune. Let him give the divine mysteries to the Christian people of all churches pertaining to his See’s right without any obligation of objection, and let him hand them on without obligation, since We have established that, on account of the petition of his impugners and for the reasons designated above, the case could not be sustained against him.

Therefore, by the principal precepts which empower Us to reform whatever ecclesiastical matters lie within the sacred city of Rome or beyond its jurisdiction, We do reform; and, the universal questions being reserved by Us to divine judgment, We exhort that the holy communion be received from him as the matter requires. Let the petitioners remember the Lord and the salvation of their souls — for He is also the lover of peace, and is Himself peace, who admonishes: My peace I give you, my peace I leave you (John 14:27); and who, affirming that peace must be confirmed in any city, says: Blessed are the peacemakers (Matt. 5:9). Let whoever, departing from Our instruction (which We do not estimate possible), either fails to admit it or thinks it can be retracted — let him see that, just as We trust in God, the contempt of his person will be returned to him in the divine judgment.

Chapter X: The Restoration of Schismatic Clergy under Their Bishop’s Mercy

11. Concerning the clergy of the said Pope, who departed from the rules against their bishop and made schism before time, We have decreed thus: that, when they have satisfied their bishop, their bishop’s mercy may follow, and that they may rejoice that the ecclesiastical offices are restored to them — because Our Lord and Redeemer rejoices when He finds sheep that had perished by error, and the heavenly Physician extends the Father’s liberality to the prodigal son. But whoever among the clergy, after the form set forth by Us, shall presume to celebrate masses anywhere in the Roman church without Pope Symmachus’s knowledge and consent during his lifetime — let him be struck by the canonical statutes as a schismatic. These things are sufficient for Us to have set forth with the sincere knowledge of God.

Subscriptions: Italian Bishops, with the Bishops of Milan and Ravenna at Their Head

12. Seventy-plus Italian bishops in attendance subscribed in succession. The order of subscription is editorially significant: Laurentius, bishop of the church of Milan, and Petrus, bishop of the church of Ravenna, subscribe first — each affirming the same formula: “To this our statute, in which we committed the whole case to God’s judgment, I have subscribed.” Following them subscribe the bishops of seventy-plus other Italian and suburbicarian sees — including those of Aquaeviva, Vercellae, Ticinum, Naples, Spoletum, Cremona, Bergomum, Ravenna’s Lombard suffragans, the Sicilian sees of Tauromenium, Tyndarium, and Lipara, and the central and southern Italian sees of Velletri, Tibur, Anteatum, Tudertum, Mevania, Reate, Ariminum, Ostia, and Portus, among others.

Notes / Historical Commentary

The fourth synod of Rome, traditionally known as the Synodus Palmaris, met on 23 October 501 and produced one of the most consequential documents in the late patristic period. The synod’s task was to address the accusations brought against Pope Symmachus by the Laurentian faction, led by the senators Festus and Probinus, in a renewed attack on the legitimate Pope’s standing more than two years after Symmachus’s election and Theodoric’s initial arbitration in his favor. Three earlier synods of 501 had failed to resolve the case, and the fourth synod was convoked at Theodoric’s order after street violence had rendered ordinary proceedings impossible. What the synod produced — and what its acts preserve — is the foundational articulation of the canonical principle that the case of the Apostolic See is reserved to divine judgment alone.

The substantive argument runs from procedural to theological. The procedural ground for not pursuing the substantive accusations is that the accusers had attempted to convict Symmachus through the testimony of slaves of his own household, who were canonically and civilly barred from accusing their masters. Without admissible testimony, the substantive case could not be heard. But this procedural ground was not the synod’s ultimate basis for its decision. The deeper ground was theological: the case of the Apostolic See is, as such, reserved to divine judgment, because the See is God’s own institution and what concerns it concerns Him.

The theological reasoning has its locus classicus in section 9: causas Dei ipsius esse judicio committendas, qui valet corpus occidere et animam mittere in gehennam — “the causes of God Himself are to be committed to His judgment, who is able to slay the body and send the soul into Gehenna.” The reasoning is structural. The See of Peter is what Peter merited and what has acceded to all his successors by the nobility of the possession; what is given by Christ’s gift to the See is given to all the rectors who hold it; therefore the See’s authority is Peter’s authority, which is Christ’s gift, beyond the cognizance of any human tribunal. The synod can recognize this principle and act upon it; it cannot evaluate the See’s case on the merits, because the case is not within human cognizance.

The Ennodian commentary on this synod, composed shortly afterward as the Apologeticum pro Synodo Palmari, makes the principle even more explicit: Aliorum forte hominum causas Deus voluerit per homines terminare; sedis istius suo sine quaestione reservavit arbitrio. Voluit beati Petri successores coelo tantum debere innocentiam et subtilissimi discussoris indagini inviolatam exhibere conscientiam — “God may have willed that other men’s cases be settled by men; but the cases of this See He reserved without question to His own judgment. He willed that Peter’s successors should owe their innocence to heaven alone, and exhibit an inviolate conscience to the inquiry of the most penetrating examiner.” Ennodius is articulating, with unmistakable clarity, what the synod’s acts state in more compressed form: the See is judged by God alone.

The modern reader should observe carefully that the Synodus Palmaris is sometimes invoked as a precedent for conciliar supremacy over the Roman Pontiff — and especially in cross-confessional polemics, the Council of Constance (1414–1418) is appealed to, with the Synodus Palmaris cast as an early example of a synod judging a Pope. The reading is precisely backwards. The Synodus Palmaris declares, as the very ground of its action, that it has no jurisdiction over the Pope’s case; that the case is reserved to divine judgment alone; and that, “to the extent the matter pertains to men,” the proceedings are dismissed without prejudice from human authority. The synod did not absolve Symmachus on the merits — it could not, since it denied it had competence to evaluate the merits. The synod declared the case beyond synodal cognizance, restored Symmachus to the full exercise of his See, and required schismatic clergy to be reconciled to him by the synod’s own canonical authority. Far from being a conciliarist precedent, this is a documentary refutation of conciliarism: when an Italian synod of substantial scope confronted the actual question of synodal authority over a Pope, it declined to exercise such authority and explicitly reserved the case to divine judgment.

Symmachus’s own conduct deserves attention on this point. He cooperated with the synodal process — he came to Rome at Theodoric’s request, gave his presence to the assembly, professed himself ready to respond, and accepted procedural restrictions for the sake of demonstrating his innocence and securing peace. But cooperation with synodal investigation is not concession of synodal jurisdiction over the Pope’s case. The reader should distinguish between the two carefully: a Pope may, for the sake of charity and peace, allow a synod to investigate accusations brought against him without thereby conceding that the synod has the authority to pronounce against him. Symmachus’s appearances and procedural cooperation are entirely consistent with his canonical claim, registered through the bishops he sent in section 7, that the canons themselves do not authorize compelling a Pope to submit to synodal judgment. The synod itself, in section 1’s report of the convocation, registers Symmachus’s own letters requesting the synod — confirming that the canonical hearing took place at the Pope’s request, not against his will.

The relation between this principle and the Council of Constance bears comment. The Council of Constance addressed a unique historical crisis: the Western Schism, with three claimants to the papacy and no effective canonical machinery for resolution. The decree Haec Sancta (1415), invoked by later conciliarists, asserted the council’s authority over the Roman pontificate. But this decree’s authority and interpretation have been disputed since the conciliarist controversies of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: it was issued in a session that included only one (and possibly disputed) papal claimant, was never formally confirmed by any uncontested Pope, and has not been received by the universal Church as a defining doctrine of the relation between Pope and council. The First Vatican Council (1869–1870) explicitly rejected conciliarism, defining that the Pope possesses ordinary, immediate, and episcopal jurisdiction over the universal Church. The principle of the Synodus Palmaris — that the case of the See is reserved to divine judgment alone — was operative in the Catholic tradition long before Constance and has been operative since, regardless of how Constance is interpreted. The fifteenth-century crisis did not undo the principle articulated in 501.

The political-historical significance of the synod is also worth noting. Theodoric’s role — convoking the synod by royal precept, then formally returning the substantive question to the synod’s own arbitrement — illustrates the operative two-powers structure that the corpus has been articulating throughout. The Arian Ostrogothic king does not pronounce on the substantive ecclesiastical question; he provides the conditions for the synod’s deliberation and receives the synod’s decision. The bishops of Liguria, Aemilia, and Venetia, drawn into the king’s presence on his journey, consult the king and proceed under royal precept — but the substantive arbitrement remains with the synod, which itself recognizes the See’s reservation to divine judgment. This is the exact structure of Duo Sunt in operative form: civil authority cooperates by providing the framework; ecclesiastical authority determines the substance; and the substance, in this particular case, includes the recognition that the See’s case is beyond even ecclesiastical-synodal determination on the substantive merits.

The reader should leave the document with a clear sense of its significance. The principle that the First See is judged by no one is here articulated, defended, and formally enacted by an Italian synod of substantial scope, with the Western imperial-Ostrogothic civil authority both convoking and ratifying the proceedings. The principle is grounded in the structural nature of the See — Peter’s merit, Christ’s gift, the See’s participation in the divine economy — rather than in any merely institutional claim. It is the most explicit articulation in the late patristic period of what would become the canonical doctrine of papal immunity from earthly judgment, and it stands behind the medieval and modern canonical traditions on this question.

The Early Church and Peter's Primacy