Epistle or Treatise of Pope Felix III, which refutes what was brought forward for Acacius, and shows him to have been justly and rightly condemned, and only to be restorable by canonical means.

Chapter I: The Historical Precedents — Athanasius, Flavian, and John Chrysostom Show That the Apostolic See’s Sole Judgment Suffices to Bind and to Loose

[… after five hundred years, do they wish to subvert the things established by Christ, when a thirty-year law of men cannot be broken?1 Saint Athanasius was therefore not condemned by the Synod of the East, because this See did not consent; Saint John of Constantinople, Saint Flavian …2

If, therefore, with that See alone not consenting, those who were condemned by a Synod of the East could not from themselves be condemned, the consequence is that even without a synod, he who has been condemned by that [See] alone condemning is condemned.3 Finally, if its sentence alone has no force, why do they so eagerly desire it to be rescinded? … by the testimony of Acacius, where he confirms that the Catholic Timothy reported the condemnation of Peter to both Romes;4 where [Acacius] says that [Peter] was ordained by a heretic, that is, an accomplice of his [Peter’s] insanity; where he says that for this reason he ought to be subjected to greater sufferings.5

Chapter II: The False “In Reserve” Argument, and the Case of John Talaia

Accordingly, it is not as if [Peter Mongus] would have been in reserve6, as is now pretended, to succeed the holy Timothy after his death; [the one] who for his own crimes — which Acacius himself reported — was subjected to sufferings: for no one asserts a man worthy of an honor reserved [for him] to be subjected to sufferings. The emperor permitted all things to the election of the Catholic Timothy; it is therefore necessary that what [Timothy] determined and declared be followed — [namely], that a Catholic [ought to be] ordained by Catholics.7 It is false, therefore, that [Peter] is said to have been established in reserve to succeed the one with whom he never communicated, and from whom he had been requested to be exiled further.

If [John] had sworn that he would not be a bishop, we can hardly follow [your reasoning].8 … how did you command that he was worthy that greater things be committed to him which pertain to the governance of the Church? Above a presbyter, what is greater for the governance of the Church than the episcopate? If he had sworn, how do you command this? and if he had sworn, why did you expose him that [something] might happen contrary to what he had sworn? Or if what you commanded was done, why are you angry, why do you say that he has perjured himself to you, when what happened was what he had not sworn he was going to do — since you commanded that this ought to be done?9 He was an apocrisarius;10 all things pertained to him; he took care of all the affairs of the Church; none among the Alexandrian clergy was held more capable than he; in honor he was a presbyter — above which what could be added to him for the governance of the Church? What more could be given to him than the episcopate? You therefore willed him to be a bishop, [you] who commanded that he ought to be above what he was (and nothing else remained except that he be bishop).

I wonder, however, if the emperor endures necessity not to expel Peter, and claims that one man could not endure necessity to do unwillingly what he did not wish — for even the emperor, when he claims necessity, declares that what he does under necessity is evil, showing that he does not wish to do it willingly and testifying that he does so unwillingly.11 If you think the person of Peter ought to be excused, we prove him guilty, heretical, and condemned; if you pretend he was in reserve because of the scandal, to succeed the Catholic Timothy, neither Acacius’s writings testify to this — which clearly state why he was excluded — nor the emperor’s, who promised the Catholic Timothy that what he had established would endure; from whose communion Peter was separated, and from whom he was demanded to be exiled further; and this was reported both here and at Constantinople, as Acacius also testifies — that [Peter] was condemned in the diaconate by the holy Proterius12 — not Peter, who was a heretic, as if placed in reserve to succeed him — [but those] ordered that those ordained by him [Peter] were to be condemned without delay unless they returned to the communion of the holy Timothy.

Chapter III: The Pretended “Correction” of Peter Mongus — the Procedural Vacuum

If [Peter] is said to have been corrected afterward, this very fact shows that he had been in error until then; nor should he have been placed over Catholics after his error, by [those by] whom he was corrected from error. Thus he was worthy of indulgence, not of honor; and especially, having been ordained by heretics, he could in no way possess the substance of episcopal dignity.13 But if this is denied, it is refuted both by Acacius’s own testimony and by the reasoning of the facts: for when the heretic Timothy was condemned with his accomplices, this man was his associate; and persisting with him until his [Timothy’s] end, he was ordained by Timothy’s followers. It must finally be asked whether he communicated with the holy Timothy up to the day of his death: if this did not happen, he will undoubtedly be among those whom the emperor said, if they did not return to the communion and grace of the Catholic Timothy within two months, would be perpetually condemned.

It is laughable that some claim Peter was ordained by the Catholic Timothy: for during his lifetime he did not ordain him, nor did Peter ever enter his communion; as has been said, [Timothy] demanded that [Peter] be exiled further, nor could he have ordained a bishop over himself while still alive — let them see whether he ordained him after death. At the time when Peter invaded the Church, the holy Timothy was not in Alexandria, nor could a bishop be ordained while he was alive, as has been said; but rather, Peter, acting nefariously, dared to take the name of the episcopate for himself while the legitimate bishop Timothy was still alive. Nor did any Catholics do this at that time, who all agreed with Timothy and communicated with him, but one accomplice of Peter’s madness, as Acacius testifies.

For Catholics, who had not communicated with the heretic Timothy [Aelurus] [and] who communicated with the Catholic Timothy [Salofaciolus], could not, while he was alive and known to be the legitimate bishop, either appoint another over him or consecrate a heretic; hence it is clear that [Peter] was ordained by heretics, and therefore cannot preside over the Catholic Church: for it would be utterly abominable and nefarious that one who long wallowed in perfidy be placed over the necks of the faithful. But if this is admitted, it could similarly be permitted for other heresies at will — which no examples, no rule, no ecclesiastical laws allow to be imposed.

But, you say, he was corrected: yet, as has been said above, this very fact proves he was a heretic; and even if he is said to have turned to the Catholic faith after condemning the heresy, he should have been subject to the Catholics by whom he was corrected, not placed over them: for a disciple is not above his master, and it would have been enough for him to offer an example of his correction, not to dominate those by whom he was corrected after long error and extended perfidy. Then I ask, what error did he condemn, what right confession did he choose, and which faith did he seek to [prove] false, and which true? If he follows the faith defined at Chalcedon and the Catholic faith, why does he communicate with those who in no way accept the truth of the two natures in Christ?14 Why does he have Dioscorus and Timothy the heretic recited [on the diptychs]?15 Why do all who come from there defend things contrary to the Chalcedonian synod, with whom Peter undoubtedly communicates? But if he declares the faith of such men to be true, it appears well enough how great an error he has been converted from.

But I do not marvel that he is said to be corrected while he remains in his perversity, since it is not clear by whom he was corrected or received: for the rule of the Church and the ancient tradition known to all is that by the bishop of his province — that is, by the bishop of the second see — he [a bishop] ought either to be examined or to be received.16 Yet even the Alexandrian bishop, even if he should judge that a man condemned for depravity must be received, should not do this before he has referred [the matter] to the Apostolic See.17 The acts of the Catholic Timothy teach this, and the examples of many others, who, receiving the libels of heretics in which they profess themselves to damn the old error, do not confirm their reception and communion until they direct the acts of those making satisfaction to this See, and request from hence, as it was done, that [the reception] ought to be confirmed.18 I ask, I say, who has examined this man, who has received [him], who has truly reconciled [him], who has admitted [him] to Catholic communion?

Meanwhile I pass over the fact that all these things belong to penitents, as they are heretics and ordained by heretics: for it is clear that he erred, who is now said to be corrected; for the pardon of those who lapsed under fear is one thing, the voluntary choice of depravity another.19 If Acacius receives this man, by what right, by what rule? When it was neither possible for that bishop himself to do this, nor did he wish to refer these matters to me — indeed [I am the one] by whom, lest he do it, it was contradicted most frequently and greatly delegated, that this man be driven further from Alexandria by priestly and Catholic right, upon Our suggestion. Why did he presume what was forbidden to him, and trample on what was enjoined? Or has the emperor examined and received him? Yet it is clear that by no rules of the Church was he [the emperor] received [as canonical examiner]; therefore his entire reception [of Peter] is foreign to ecclesiastical rule.

Chapter IV: The Emperor Is a Son, Not a Prelate — the Two Powers

But if you say: “The emperor is Catholic” — with all peace to him, let us have said: he is a son, not a prelate of the Church:20 in matters of religion, it is fitting for him to learn, not to teach; he has the privileges of his own power, which he has divinely received for the administration of public affairs; and, not ungrateful for its benefits, he should usurp nothing against the heavenly order: for God has willed that what pertains to the governance of the Church belongs to priests, not to the powers of this world; and [the powers of this world], if they are faithful, He has willed to be subject to His Church and to her priests.

Let him not claim another’s right and the ministry assigned to another, lest he rashly oppose the One by whom all things have been established, and appear to fight against the benefits of the One from whom he has received his own power. Almighty God has willed the lords and priests of the Christian religion to be ordained, and examined, and received from error by pontiffs and priests — not by public laws or the powers of this world.21 Christian emperors ought to subject their executions to ecclesiastical prelates, not prefer [them] above.

There is therefore no certain examination, nor can this reception of his endure, whom the Church has neither examined nor restored to communion by her laws, in the proper order; and thus Acacius, rather than recalling him to Catholic communion, communicated with his error and prostituted the Catholic faith to him:22 for whose reception is not properly ordered, it follows that he has remained in error. We have also removed Acacius from Our communion, lest through him We too be deemed to have communicated with Peter, who was neither examined nor received by any ecclesiastical rule and thus persists in his original error.

Chapter V: Acacius Convicted by His Own Mouth — the Ex Ore Tuo Argument

But how is Acacius not guilty for communicating with one whom he reported as condemned? “Does sweet and bitter water flow from the same spring?” (James 3:11).23 For when the Apostle says: “If I rebuild what I destroyed, I make myself a prevaricator” (Gal. 2:18) — when such an Apostle says this, I say — you judge whether Acacius is not a prevaricator, who praised with his mouth what he had previously condemned.

“From your own mouth you will be justified, and from your own mouth you will be condemned” (Matt. 12:37);24 “Peace, peace, and there is no peace” (Jer. 6:14);25 for peace is “charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith” (1 Tim. 1:5). What of these [virtues] is in Peter? What of these is shown to be in Acacius? The one, not examined nor received by any legitimate ecclesiastical rule, remains in his depravity; this one [Acacius] becomes an accomplice of one persisting in depravity, even after he himself professed him condemned.

Chapter VI: The Necessity Objection Refuted

But, you say, Acacius communicated with Peter under imperial necessity.26 This very fact suffices: for what is said to be done under necessity is shown to be perverse.27 Let Acacius, or whoever claims this, see whether he professes the Catholic emperor to be the author of this depravity.

We do not believe this of a Catholic emperor — whose sacred [decrees] We retain, in which he testifies that he holds the Catholic faith and the definitions of the Chalcedonian synod; and therefore We also demand from him that heretics be expelled. And he who says that the emperor either does not wish or cannot do what he believes, thinks worse of him: for nothing should be preferred to the Divinity, and it is impious not to promptly execute with ready will what pertains to God. We, I say, do not believe this of the emperor: far be it that he be said to oppose the Catholic faith, which he openly professes, and the honor of the empire. But he does oppose it, God forbid, if he compels anyone under necessity to do what is hostile to the Catholic Church: this very fact, as has been said, proves that what is said to be done under necessity is perverse.

But let those who claim this see to it regarding the emperor: We, however, also cite the emperor’s sacred [decrees] in this matter, in which he promises that he did everything by Acacius’s counsel; and We likewise produce Acacius’s own writings, which praise the emperor for doing these things.28 No one praises what he endures under necessity; no one by his own counsel asks that necessity be brought upon himself. If he did it under necessity, let him confess that what he did is evil; for he does not do willingly what he does unwillingly; he does not do by will what he does by necessity: he confesses it is evil, which he would not wish to happen if he were not pressed by necessity.

If what he does under necessity is evil, why does he praise it? Why does he become a preacher of the thing to the ruin of others — which he does unwillingly? Hence it appears that what he does is not of necessity but of will — since indeed it pleases him, since he praises it, since he proclaims it above the earlier pontiffs; indeed, he says that now the Alexandrian Church breathes and is satisfied with the abundance of spiritual nourishment29 — about which he had previously said, when he was expelled, that the hearts of the faithful, that is, his people, rejoiced with the father, that is, with the Catholic Timothy. Finally, let him see whether he says the emperor does all things that are evil: for when he claims to endure necessity, he declares that what he does is evil and that he does not do it willingly. So great are these evils that he would not wish to do them if necessity did not compel him: with us, what he greatly praises shows that he does it not by necessity but by will.

But if they agree that they erred and seek a remedy, let them seek the remedy in their proper order; let them allow their wounds to be healed; the patient never prescribes to the physician the treatments for his condition; therefore let them patiently allow the wounds they inflicted on the Church through all their excesses to be healed, that they may receive true health — especially since they do not deny that they committed these evils.

Chapter VII: The Alexandrian Popular Demand — And What If the People Demanded Idolatry?

But, you say, the Alexandrian people demanded this with great desire, nor do they permit Peter to be withdrawn from them by any reasoning.30 What if the Alexandrian people should demand that idolatry be prepared for them? For what difference is there whether a heretic or a profane person be permitted to be imposed on the Catholic Church? What if they demand a man of some other heresy to be applied as their prelate? For if this is done with one heresy, it can be done with another if it pleases them to demand it.

If, among the customs of men, something should be attempted against public laws, would a good emperor in no way consent to it? Against God, will he acquiesce in those demanding [it]? If we must yield to those desiring perverse things, where is imperial authority? Where is moderation? Where is the governance of laws? If what is demanded against the Catholic faith and ecclesiastical rule must be granted, how shall a Catholic emperor permit — lest it be against the will of men — that it be against God? that wicked — rather, deadly — desires not be usefully corrected; that those plotting insane things not be corrected; that they perish eternally?

Nor is it the mark of a good emperor or of a Catholic prince to grant to those who demand them things that are hostile to them; indeed, it is salutary for them, for the entire commonwealth, for its safety, and for the kingdom, not to have yielded in things that are against God. But, you say, they are neither contrary to good morals nor to right faith. How are they not harmful to good morals — to demand a perfidious associate of murderers, a companion of heretics, and a condemned man as administrator of divine things — whom it would be unlawful or unfitting to appoint even for public dignity? How is it not contrary to religion to wish a condemned heretic, who obtained the false name of priest from heretics, to preside over the Catholic faith?

Chapter VIII: The Persistent Monophysite Communicants — Living Proof That Peter’s “Correction” Is Fiction

But, you say, he was corrected, and all those by whom he was corrected and approved desired this. Let us carefully examine who these people are. Certainly, they are the very ones you testify were corrected from error along with him. It remains that there is no doubt they are his accomplices: by what laws, then, should their testimony be admitted for anyone, when they are involved in the same crime? But, you say, those who seemed to communicate with the Catholic Timothy now communicate with Peter and have demanded the same concerning him. Therefore these [are] notable for their prevarication of Catholic communion, who, as it is said, after they preserved the communion of the Catholic Timothy until his death, have fallen after his passing into the fellowship of this man [Peter Mongus], with whom the Catholic Timothy is never shown to have communicated. Thus they have fallen from the communion of the Catholic Timothy — indeed from Catholic communion.

Behold, [this is] how Peter is “corrected and approved,” who is said to have been demanded as prelate either by his accomplices in depravity or by those who, deviating from Catholic communion, have joined his fellowship; and therefore they unceasingly persecute Catholics. We have heard assiduously, and have come to know by certain report, who are said to communicate with him and who are separated from his communion: [they are] those who are seen daily to act against the Catholic faith, against the preaching of the Apostolic See, and against what has been established by the Chalcedonian synod. Which is so true that We can produce as witnesses the sons of his paternal madness here [in Rome]. For all the Egyptians who are detained in this city for various matters of business and who communicate with Peter, cannot bear to hear the Chalcedonian synod and its definitions — to the point that they dare to accuse us for holding to these things.31

Thus it is clear from the disciples what the master teaches, and from the offspring, the nefarious parent is recognized. They openly declare that if they hear Peter preaching the Chalcedonian synod, they would not hesitate to anathematize him: here it is clear enough what kind of doctrine they testify he professes. We certainly ask of you whether you think the Chalcedonian synod ought to be followed or not; if not, how do you profess in your letters to hold it? It is clear, then, that not only do none of you stand firm in the Catholic definition, but you do not even stand by your own profession; how, then, shall we believe you who boast of holding the Catholic faith, when you do not even hold to what you publish in writing?

But if, bound by your profession, you affirm that you will in every way observe the decrees of the Chalcedonian synod, and likewise the preaching of the Apostolic See, which was read, discussed, and received in that synod, and you say you will accept these definitions — which the blessed Pope Leo of holy memory confirmed to the Emperor Leo of august memory with the testimonies of all the previous pontiffs who have been throughout the world since the time of our Lord and Savior, in the letter he sent — if, therefore, you follow the ancient faith, and what was handed down to us by the Holy Fathers, and do not in any way depart from the teaching of the whole Church (since we are neither wiser than our majors, nor is it lawful for us to usurp anything newly otherwise than what they learned and taught; nor are we more learned expositors and interpreters of that Nicene council than those many and most venerable prelates, who wisely understood or faithfully preached [it]) — let us all hold this with sincere mind and true heart in common, and there is peace.

Let us also keep inviolate the rules which the Church received from those same Fathers, and there is peace. Let these things be certain among you, let them be fixed, and there is no discord. But if you claim these are inviolate among you, bear with our solicitude32 to examine these matters for a little while, since the truer the peace we wish to have, the more certain the cause of peace we desire to know. If these remain inviolate among you, what is it, then, that you say that Peter of Alexandria has been corrected to the Catholic faith, and been received? He has cast off everything, then, which these definitions oppose, and has transitioned into this form of Catholic doctrine with his whole heart? What do these men want for themselves then — whom we daily recognize crying out among us, raging and gnashing their teeth against the Chalcedonian synod, against the preaching of the Apostolic See? If they are corrected, do they hold those things mentioned above? If they hold them, why do they vehemently oppose [them]? If they profess them, why do they dissent from Catholics who steadfastly hold the same profession? Or why do those who profess the true faith dissent from their fellowship? If they knew them to hold one faith with themselves, it appears, then, that these who do not hesitate to openly oppose what pertains to the Catholic faith, who dissent from the profession of Catholics, are not at all Catholics, and therefore have been corrected by no reasoning.

What then? Why does Peter communicate with them? If he has been examined and proven by faith’s true examination, while these remain in error — if he corrected himself — he has been transferred to what pertains to the Catholic faith, not remaining in what is proved to be hostile to it. Why, then, does he communicate with such people? If he openly professes the faith to which, having put off his error, he is known to have gone over — why does he communicate with the enemies of that faith? Thus it is clearer than light that he has not been corrected, but remains in the same pestilence, communicating with its followers and professors. Behold, then, even this, which you wish him to be corrected, is shown to be false and most evidently refuted.

Therefore, even if he were corrected, he ought to have been subject to his correctors, not placed over them — especially since, having been ordained by heretics, he could not preside by any rule; and in this part also he is convicted who is alleged to be corrected, when he is found without doubt to communicate with those who remain in depravity; and he is therefore rightly and justly expelled from Our communion by every reasoning. Behold what a just cause this provides Us, that We have also separated Acacius from Our communion, who both justly reported him as condemned before, and afterward nefariously received him into his communion.

Chapter IX: The Five-Year Admonition, the Legates’ Betrayal, and the Continuing Necessity-Claim

For with Acacius, We had an ancient communion; to keep this inviolate, We admonished him for five years;33 and although he did not deign to reply, We never ceased to exhort him to hold to the Catholic faith. Finally, We sent legates, We threatened, We entreated, We warned with threats, persuasion, and entreaties, presenting condemnation, that he might not yield to the communion of the corrupt; We reminded him of the labors he had previously undertaken for the Catholic faith, urging him to glory and deterring him from danger. Despising all this, he deceived the legates, pretending to err with us, and joined in communion with the heretic and condemned man whom he himself had reported — until I learned of this.34 While I did not know this, I could have maintained my former communion with him; but when I discovered it, if I had not immediately separated him from my communion, it would have seemed that I remained in communion with a prevaricator, and that the communion I had with a Catholic was also with one who preferred the fellowship of heretics.

Therefore it was necessary for me to break off his communion and separate him from my fellowship, for it was not safe for the Catholic faith not to do this at all. But, you say, the emperor imposes necessity on Acacius to communicate with Peter. Much has already been said above about this necessity, and much will be said, by which it may be shown that, even if the necessity were true, a priest should have despised it for the Catholic faith and endured any adversity, so long as he did not deviate from the integrity of the Catholic faith; and then it is clearly shown by evident reasoning that no necessity was imposed on Acacius by the emperor, as it is rather clear that the emperor did everything by Acacius’s counsel.

You also say that the emperor himself has a necessity to do these things. I do not now inquire into the cause of this necessity; yet no necessity is greater than to be subject to divine worship and religion, from which all things prosper, from which all necessity is resolved, and all adversities are removed, nor to prefer anything to it; for there is nothing that should be preferred to God, since we have been commanded not to prefer even our own souls to Him: for if He is neglected, no necessity can be resolved, nor can any human affair endure. Hence it is clear that there is a greater necessity and a greater cause above all to postpone everything to Him. Moreover, there is no necessity, but it is pretended to be …35

A vain sedition is proposed regarding Peter’s exclusion; for when the heretic Timothy [Aelurus] was expelled, no one attempted to resist, and when Peter was subsequently ejected, no one opposed it.36 It is falsely claimed, therefore, that it cannot be done, when it has already been done without tumult, as these examples show. Let money not be the cause, and there is no necessity.37 The tumult in the murder of the holy Proterius was stirred by the irruption of heretics, but a tumult has never been incited by Catholics: and it is fitting that the seditions of any people be suppressed by public authority. Thus, to indulge the fury of the wicked, who could have been subdued by slight fear, divine religion is subverted, and the Church of Christ is torn apart.

Finally, by this very claim of necessity, he declares that what he does is evil; hence, if he has a necessity to act against divine things, I have no necessity to do so: I must avoid the evil that you also confess is evil, since you testify that you do it unwillingly under necessity. Indeed, I have a greater necessity of divine fear and future judgment to avoid evil. Why do you try to draw me into your wickedness, which you do under necessity, when I have no necessity to undergo it? Rather, as has been said, there is a greater necessity not to do it for another reason.

Chapter X: “Correct Me But Do Not Separate Me” — The Pastoral Appeal and Its Refutation

But, you say, correct me and do not separate me from your fellowship. Abandon evil, turn to good, return to me, and you are corrected, freed from evil, and not separated from me. But, you say, I cannot, and you should not abandon me. You grieve, as I see, because I do not perish with you; but I grieve that you do not save yourself with me.38 If Peter’s person is so important to you that you despise God, that is your concern; I neither ought nor wish to do this.

You say, demand what can be done. And I say to you, ask of me what can be done: for it is easier for a man to be set aside for God, than God to be rejected for a man: but if that cannot be done, much less can it happen among us that, with God rebuffed, a man be chosen. We have a greater reason why we cannot do this, than you have why you should not wish to: we are able.

Say, say, all of you: “Anathema to Peter!” — as long as he lives, do not communicate with him, and We communicate with you.39 And what account shall We render to God, if the souls He destroys are taken to perish, even with Us somehow permitting it? Where are you trying to drag me? Why do you not rather return to me? There is perdition, here is salvation; there is precipice, here is sure safety; there is deception, here is warning; you do not wish to return to these salutary things, and you want me to descend to dangerous ones. I do not know if even with you as judge I should do this.

Chapter XI: Acacius Under Basiliscus — His Own Earlier Precedent Refutes the Necessity-Claim

But, you say, Acacius was oppressed by force and is oppressed, so that he either came to these things or does not correct them. That he did not suffer force is proven by many reasons, indeed it is shown: for if he had not wished it, he would not have come to these things; moreover, he is refuted by his own letters, which show that everything was done by his counsel, and he praises them as if divinely inspired. But even if he suffered force from the emperor … he should not have plotted against the legates through the emperor, as has already been stated by the testimony of our legates. If this is true, he is guilty; if false, we burden these men further, adding to their prevarication the additional charge of lying. But since this is also shown by Acacius’s letters, they did not say this falsely; thus, his person is burdened, who did not strive with our legates but rather plotted against them. Indeed, he should have at least reported this before communicating, and warned them not to communicate.

Finally, even if he is oppressed by force, he ought to have endured the force, not to have betrayed the faith and communion by joining the perfidious and condemned, as did Flavian of holy memory40, and others under persecuting emperors, whether heretics or pagans, and as was recently done in Africa.41 For what? Did they not suffer great force? And therefore they overcame by enduring force, not by yielding to violence. Under those persecutors, were not those who denied Christ or turned to heresy rightly condemned by Catholics and Christians? Was it an excuse that they could not persist because they suffered force?

Hence, you say, remedies have been provided for the lapsed. Good: I accept, if it pleases, that he be received in the manner of the lapsed, doing penance throughout his life and receiving communion at the end, as is established for the lapsed; let us recall him to the Church according to the form of this ordinance.42 But now, if the healing of the entire Church is applied, it will be of such importance (for this pertains to the pontiff of the Apostolic See, and the cause of universal healing seems to require this)43 that Acacius’s person may be restored to priestly honor. For by this very fact, he would show that he did not succumb willingly and maintained a Catholic spirit, since he properly pursues healing. But if he wishes to and cannot, why does he oppress others through the imperial person? If the emperor, as is said, is obedient to Acacius, he can; if the emperor is not obedient to him — although he should have been and ought to be treated steadfastly and courageously — he certainly confesses by this very fact that he succumbs against Catholic truth.

Thus, it is clear that I cannot join in communion with him in this state of affairs: for if he is oppressed and cannot help himself, I should not become an accomplice of his oppression and prevarication; but since, by God’s gift, I am free, I at least keep myself safe, so that if he now can, when God commands, there may be someone who can assist those who have lost the integrity of communion and faith, for the sake of that integrity; otherwise, if we all lose it, God forbid, how will it be restored afterward? Especially if, in the Apostolic See — which God forbid should ever happen — its summit were to be violated.44 Therefore, if Acacius endures human force so as not to correct his errors, I have a greater necessity of divine fear, of preserving Catholic communion and faith, by no means to become a partaker of those placed in error under any condition, but to keep myself entirely free from their contagion: for if he has an excuse through force, I, who am safe by the Lord’s grace, as has been said, can have no excuse, since I am pressed by no force. Let these matters therefore be left to divine judgment, until He — as We have so often experienced — restores liberty to Catholic communion and the Christian faith; and then We will deal with those who are in his error; for Acacius’s person cannot be absolved without the healing of the entire Church, through which the whole Church has been wounded.

But, you say, Acacius was in communion with you even when the heretic Timothy, or this Peter, held the Alexandrian Church under the tyrant Basiliscus.45 You speak truly — but at that time Acacius did not communicate with them at all and remained in my communion; whence rather, if Acacius [now] suffers force, he should now show himself as he showed himself under the tyrant Basiliscus, the heretic persecutor of his.46

But now, you say, it is in the interest of the public good. But a priest should have argued that it is rather in the interest of the public good that divine communion and faith be preserved intact: is the subversion of religion useful to the public good, and the integrity of religion not useful to the public good? I do not know if those who claim this are of the same religion, or if people of the same religion should claim this.

Chapter XII: John Talaia’s Cause Is Better — the Sentence Against the Prevaricator, Not the Person

… that he might choose from his own, faithful to him, a priest to stand in suspect places — excluding John, provided he was Catholic and in our communion, to preside as a pontiff.47 Does this not clearly show that John’s cause is better, since, with him excluded and a heretic substituted, it is shown that this was not due to the person but to the assault on the Catholic faith?

We did not pronounce a sentence against Acacius on this account — because he is a man, because he is called Acacius, as could be said of any heretic — but on this account, because he is a person of prevarication.48 Thus, what was done wrong in him was punished by the imposition of the sentence: if this prevarication, this crime, is removed, he will no longer be the person against whom I seemed to pronounce an indissoluble sentence. For he will remain a man, and Acacius, whom I do not condemn insofar as he is a man and bears the name of a man, but insofar as he is a prevaricator and evildoer. The sentence I pronounced as indissoluble against him will no longer have any place once that for which it was imposed is removed: for he will be a different person from the one against whom the sentence was pronounced, when he begins not to be what he was, or not to be that for which the sentence was imposed. But when he begins to be what he was not, or begins to be only himself, upon which [state] the sentence was not imposed, the sentence pronounced will not remain where it was established. For as long as he remains in that for which the sentence was imposed, that sentence is truly indissoluble with him; but when this is no longer the case, even if he does not remain in it, the sentence will undoubtedly pass away with the crime for which it was indissolubly imposed.

Thus, in him it will be dissoluble — rather, it will not exist — for one against whom it was not imposed; indeed, it will be foreign and alien to him, for whom it is not established to have been imposed: for in Acacius, the crime and prevarication received that indissoluble sentence, not because he is a man, not because he is called Acacius; with the crime removed from him, the sentence will be removed with all its force and cause.

In the Scriptures we also find an interminable sentence imposed upon many sinners, which is nevertheless remitted to those withdrawing from sin;49 and some are said to be killed and brought to life (when what they were is killed in them, and they begin to be what they were not), or to be uprooted and planted, and such things: “Three days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown” (Jonah 3:4);50 likewise concerning King Hezekiah, fifteen years being added to his life after the announcement of death to life (Is. 38:5);51 likewise concerning the branches broken off and grafted in (Rom. 11:17ff.); and concerning those same branches, if they do not remain in unbelief, they will obtain mercy. “Lest at some time they be converted and I heal them” (Is. 6:10): this was said of those who had a stubborn heart, and seeing did not see, and hearing did not hear. Were not some of those same Jews, by God’s inspiration, such that seeing they saw, hearing they heard, and believed in heart? — like the apostles and the so many thousands whom the Apostle testifies were saved as a remnant, who treats this meaning thus, where he says: “For I also am an Israelite” (Rom. 11:1).52

Chapter XIII: The Doubled Sentence — Vitalis, Misenus, and the Impossibility of Acacius’s Absolution Under Current Terms

If Acacius is pressed by imperial force to do what he does, he first declares that the emperor acts against the Catholic faith, and thus is not Catholic: there is no reason, then, for him to persuade us to say what he himself asserts or testifies. Moreover, by claiming to suffer force, he declares that what he does is evil and that he acts against the Catholic faith: why, then, does he urge and demand that I should be an accomplice in this thing, which he confesses to be perverse? But if he claims it is not evil, it remains that he should not persuade us that he suffers force from the emperor, since he does it willingly, which he confirms to be good. For when he says that what he does is good, he undoubtedly shows that he does it willingly as something he thinks is good: thus, Acacius does not do this under compulsion as something evil he does unwillingly, but willingly as something good. If he does it under compulsion, he does it unwillingly; if unwillingly, it is certainly evil; thus, he does not do it willingly as something good, but unwillingly as something evil: if not unwillingly as something evil, it follows that he does it willingly as something good. Therefore, he does it with zeal, will, and his own judgment, not coerced; thus, he does not suffer force, but sins willingly.

But, you say, by your obstinacy you bring the cause of the entire Church into danger. If the Catholic faith and communion are preserved, does religion come into danger, or is religion endangered? And if, God forbid, the Catholic faith and communion are violated, is religion not brought into danger, or is religion safe? Far be it that any Catholic and son of the Apostolic faith should say this. But, you say, by this obstinacy you diminish the dignity of the Apostolic See. If the Catholic faith and communion are preserved, is the dignity of the Apostolic See diminished? If they are violated, does the dignity of the Apostolic See remain? Far be it that any Catholic Christian should assert this. If the Catholic faith and communion are harmed, is the commonwealth helped? And if they are preserved, is the commonwealth harmed? Far be it that a Christian and Catholic should profess this. If the Catholic faith and communion are preserved, is the emperor harmed? And if they are violated, is the emperor not harmed? Far be it that a Christian and Catholic emperor, or any Catholic Christian, should say this — that this should happen, that the Catholic faith and communion should be harmed so that the emperor be not harmed, because if the Catholic faith and communion are preserved, the emperor would be harmed.

We love the emperor so much that We wish him to do what is for his own salvation, what is for his own soul, what is for his own conscience.53 Even if an offense is proven by Catholic pontiffs, let it be relaxed; it is his to do what he knows benefits his conscience, his soul, and his salvation: if he does not wish to do what is beneficial in these matters, let him see to it. We are absolved before God and men: for if it is fitting for pontiffs to intercede before God even for the guilty, how much more fitting is it for pontiffs to intercede before God for priests? If he intercedes for the sacrilegious, how much more fitting is it for us to intercede for those who, as he says, have harmed him.

Why do you wish to exaggerate Acacius’s prevarication and confirm his condemnation, so that I appear more and more inconsistent and contrary to my own sentence? If I, God forbid, had become an accomplice in evil, I would now need a remedy, not offer [one]; and the See of Blessed Peter, which God forbid should happen, would seek a remedy elsewhere, not provide it itself.54 Why, then, do you resent that we pronounced a sentence against Acacius — which, if we had not done, we could in no way have distinguished and protected the Catholic communion from the heretical and condemned communion with which he joined himself, and kept it inviolate? How do you compel us, by a sort of repeated decree, to confirm and redouble the just sentence against Acacius with the exaggeration of his prevarication?

Will Misenus and Vitalis be able to be received, unless they say anathema to Peter the Alexandrian and to all who communicated or communicate with him after the anathema?55 Thus, with us defining, they will consequently condemn Acacius again. How, then, do you wish to absolve him? Does it seem grave that Acacius, once condemned, should be condemned [again] by them — and it will not be grave? Do you wish it to seem or be said, whether through you or us, that the Apostolic See was deceived? Behold, we have demanded of you; behold, you have written; behold, he did not deign to reply, neither to you nor to me: you see the obstinate ruin of his depravity; should you not be united with us both for the sake of religion and for the injury done to you?

They say: tell us whether you will absolve Vitalis and Misenus or not. We respond and ask you in turn: whether you wish them to be absolved with the Catholic faith, communion, and reverence for the Apostolic See preserved — or not. If you do not wish [it] with these preserved, we will not save them in this way or by such reasoning. But, they say, you promised. What I promised is recorded; this I now strive to fulfill: for I promised to deliberate how they might justly be absolved; this I now undoubtedly promise. Know, therefore, that our deliberation has been brought to this point: that we cannot absolve them unless our sentence seems to be justly relaxed before the appointed time, unless we relieve them of the burden of their prevarication, make them more curable, and it is deemed worthy to anticipate our sentence against them, whom we have found guilty of a lesser fault; and we say it is enough that, since they committed some fault in their negligence, they have been corrected thus far and removed from sacred communion.

But if, to absolve them, we say they were deceived and misled, it follows that as much as we lighten their burden, we burden Acacius; for you will not wish to say anything else, nor can we judge otherwise, than that he is the author of the entire prevarication, since their confession in the synodal acts holds that they were ordered to say this.56 Thus, if with repeated assertions, a doubled profession, a recent discussion, and a decree, we confirm that the sentence pronounced against Acacius is just, with the full exaggeration of his prevarication, you must find a way for him to be absolved afterward, whom we condemn with a sort of repeated testimony. How, I say, do we strive to absolve him, whom we bind with the chains of his entire prevarication; and whom we strive to lift, we crush with the full weight of condemnation?

Therefore, either let them wait to be freed by the healing of the entire Church according to the sentence, or pledge to us under oath that nothing will ever be demanded regarding Acacius’s absolution. For why do you wish to absolve him in such a way that you expose both our conscience and our reputation? Our conscience, if I absolve one who professed himself the author of the entire betrayal; our reputation, by the change of the entire sentence. Nor can it be said that, since the sentence was pronounced against them as the authors of the crimes until a certain time, it was retracted from them as innocent, so that the same reasoning applied to them should be applied to Acacius until that time, because he is the author of the entire evil. For against Acacius, as the author, I said my sentence would be indissoluble, not to be relaxed at a certain time: and if I confirm it again, it will remain in its own terms, so that he cannot be absolved; for it was not said there, “until that time,” but “never to be dissolved.”

But, you say, although you said this, you now strive to absolve him. It is enough that a sentence once pronounced seeks a resolution: why do you wish me to repeat my decree? If you resent the sentence pronounced once, why do you strive to double it? If it seems difficult to absolve a sentence pronounced once, what shall we do with a doubled sentence? Perhaps I could address something I understood less than was stated in the resolution of a sentence pronounced once: but once I have confirmed it with a doubled profession, what remedy do you wish me to have — especially if I show that I confirm it at the very time I strive to absolve? But, you say, the emperor forced Acacius. I will not say this, because it is not true, and I cannot openly accuse the prince; let you be the authors of this accusation.

Chapter XIV: Rome’s Firmness as the Support of the Eastern Catholics

Through what was said in the terms of the pronounced sentence, since these matters are to be addressed with the effort of a Christian prince or people, this is less accomplished due to their obstinacy. If we wish to address the cause of Misenus and Vitalis, whose communion and consent made them obstinate, we burden those we think should be absolved, and with the exaggeration of their sin, our sentence becomes irrevocable from the appointed time. For the reception of these must be handled in such a way that our conscience and the reputation of those concerned are most carefully preserved in the revocation of the sentence, and we show that we justly revoked it before the time, or remitted it: so that we may also console those who persevere in the Catholic faith, proving that they did not communicate by our command at that time, nor did we consent to their communion, and that we persevere with them in the Catholic faith.57

Therefore, they also strive to remain steadfast with us; but if they hear that the sentence was relaxed for these before the appointed time without any appearance of justice, they will believe that they communicated by our will. And this, which we seemed to suspend, they may think was a pretense for the shadow of an excuse, and they will rightly judge us as prevaricators, as partakers of an alien communion, or violators of Catholic communion. How, then, can these matters be addressed? A just reasoning must be sought; and there is no other way than for these to be relieved and excused, whom we wish to absolve before the appointed time, and for our remission to seem just: this can be done if the entire prevarication is transferred to Acacius.

Those who persevere in the Catholic faith eagerly expect this to happen, for they are more enraged against him than against these; and they will consider it of great importance that these be absolved, provided they hear that all the evil is transferred to him as the author of the prevarication. When this is done, it undoubtedly follows that the punishment is just, that the condemnation is just, which seems to have been inflicted on him for these things: which condemnation is shown to be indissoluble in its own terms. Thus, Acacius’s person becomes irremediable in the exaggeration of the crime and the agreement of vengeance: for if Acacius’s person is freed by the healing of the entire Church, these will also be absolved in every way according to our sentence.

Thus, this method, which we mentioned above — because neither the emperor nor the people strive for it — will not be able to resolve either side but will burden them: hence, the remedy for these matters must be provided only in this way, that the absolution of Acacius be addressed first with the healing of the entire Church alone, and thus these be absolved in their proper order. But if Acacius refuses to be absolved in every way, their persons will be lightened by his burden. All the more so because Acacius is proven to have rejected what was offered to him, and our sentence will be excused, both in the absolution of these before the time, and in the confirmation of his condemnation with the exaggeration of his crime.

Therefore, those who persevere in the Catholic faith in the East remain steadfast because they see that I defend it, and they are encouraged by me: otherwise, either they will fall because of me, or if I fall, God forbid, and they persevere, they will rightly condemn me before God and men. They did not abandon me even under persecution; shall I abandon them without persecution? What shall I say to God, what to men? I can say to them: I could not have confirmed the condemnation against Acacius otherwise than by absolving Vitalis and Misenus with the exaggeration of his sin; but to then compel me to absolve Acacius with the exaggeration of his evil, what reason, what account shall I give him?

But, you say, if the entire Church is healed through Acacius, the absolution of one man is of such importance, at any time and whenever. But my conscience is at stake, and the reproach of my levity is at issue. For if the Church is healed through Acacius, this very fact shows that what could be healed through him, that is, by his correction, was also harmed through him, since it could not have been harmed if he had not sinned. But, you say, if you cast the burden of these onto Acacius, you rightly absolve them: and since Acacius acted to heal the Church, you will fittingly absolve Acacius. If this is the hope, why do you compel me to burden him with the weight of condemnation, whom you testify can or should be absolved? Let these be absolved by Acacius’s burden — but why do you wish me to burden him, whom I strive to absolve? Because, you say, these cannot be helped otherwise: but by this, you either wish to crush him or expose me.

Chapter XV: The Minority in Truth, the Majority in Error — And the Sole Path to Dissolution

But, you say, by this obstinacy, you diminish your privileges. So, to have no less right, shall we become heretics, and to not lose the ecclesiastical privileges of power, shall we lose religion itself? So that the dignity of the Apostolic See may not be diminished in a few, shall it err in many?58 I do not know if anyone would say that falsehood should be followed with the many rather than truth preserved and defended with the few. Will falsehood not be falsehood because it is held by the multitude? Will truth not be truth because it is held by the few?59 For truth consists not in multitude, but in any part or portion of itself, and religion is fixed only in truth, and its privileges consist only where religion itself is firm. Will truth not be truth if it is in a few, and will falsehood not be falsehood in the many? Falsehood in the many is a greater error; truth in a few suffers no detriment, for truth remains fixed in any part of itself; and just as the multitude does not make falsehood not falsehood, so the fewness does not make truth not truth.

There are countless examples showing that while falsehood prevailed among the many, truth stood firm in the few. But, you say, we abhor this. What, then, shall we do? Shall we not hold to truth in the few and err with the many? Far be it, you say. Let us then reject falsehood even with the many, so long as we hold to truth even in the fewest. Did not the Church stand firm in the apostles when the whole world held to falsehood, just as truth commanded? Did not the Church remain in the seven thousand in Israel when the whole people went astray?60 And if we examine everything, we find countless examples: is it not written that the way that leads to life is narrow and confined, and the way that leads to death is wide and spacious (Matt. 7:13-14)?

But, you say, they claim to hold what is more correct. Yet what they confess to hold, if it is better, will already be false — for if they hold something better, they hold something different; it follows that they must prove they hold it better than we do. If they hold it better, let them abstain from me, who hold it wrongly: correction to the faith and following what is better should come by will, not by force. I am not a burden to them; why are they a burden to me? I do not seek to be corrected by them; why do they impose on me, why do they force themselves on me unwillingly? If they think my sentence is of no value, let them despise it; why do they so eagerly demand its absolution? If they demand absolution and do not doubt that it is of some importance, they confirm that it is a just condemnation, by which they do not deny he is bound.61

Therefore, let him confess the error for which the sentence was imposed; let him abandon the error, and the sentence is void.62 If it is unjust, he should not care to remedy it, since an unjust sentence cannot burden anyone before God and His Church. Thus, let him not desire to be absolved from that by which he does not see himself bound; but if he judges himself bound by it and seeks to be absolved, he certainly does not claim it is unjust, which could bind him, and he seeks to be absolved from it because only a just sentence could bind him. But if it is just, it is recognized as just only when the error is condemned. Therefore, to dissolve the just obligation of the sentence, let him confess the error: let him abandon the error that holds him bound by the just sentence; with its cause removed, the obligation is dissolved.