The Early Church and Peter's Primacy

The Tractate of Pope Gelasius Against Andromachus

Synopsis: The treatise of Pope Gelasius condemning the superstitious celebration of the Lupercalia and demonstrating that the calamities suffered by Rome have proceeded not from the cessation of the Lupercalia but from her own crimes — addressed to the senator Andromachus and the circle of Roman aristocrats who, while professing Christianity, sought to revive the ancient pagan festival on the grounds that public misfortune had followed its abolition.

Pope Gelasius I, Against Andromachus the Senator and the Other Romans Who Resolved to Practice the Lupercalia According to the Old Custom.

He condemns the superstitious celebration of the Lupercalia, and proves that the misfortunes of Rome have come about not from the discontinuance of the Lupercalia, but from her own crimes.

Chapter I: That Those Who Charge the Church with Public Calamity Speak Without Knowledge, and That the Bishop’s Solicitude Obliges Him to Address Even the Offenses of the Powerful

Certain men sit in their houses, not knowing what they say or about what they make their assertions, striving to judge others when they themselves are not judged, willing to accuse before they know, and to teach before they have learned, and — without examining the matter, without investigating its causes, without seeking out its principle — to spew forth without consideration whatever has come to their lips, and to vomit it out headlong; not weighing what they say in the assertion of truth, but proving what they do not know with the zeal of evil-speaking. And they have so far advanced as to strive to tear apart even rightly-done deeds with a malevolent purpose — who, if they were wise, would not at all rush headlong into a verdict, but, having first searched out the matters, would bring forth what was to be said.

But because they accuse Us of being slothful censors in the correction of the vices of the Church, let them consequently acknowledge from Us that not only is bodily adultery a sin which ought to be discussed and rightly punished, but that there is a far greater kind of fornication and adultery — which in any Christian whatsoever, since every Christian is a member of the Church, ought competently to be vindicated; for by so much is the offense of sacrilege the greater, by so much as the fornication of the soul is worse than that of the body. For through the fornication of the soul one departs from union with God Himself, and passes over to unclean spirits by a kind of spiritual adultery.

How, therefore, does he not fall into this very category — who, while wishing himself to be seen as a Christian, and professing it, and saying it, nevertheless does not shrink to preach openly and publicly, does not flee, does not tremble, that diseases are produced because demons are not worshiped, and because to the god February sacrifice is not offered? I see whence these ravings have arisen. How is he not a prevaricator who incurs into these blasphemous profanities? How is he not to be reckoned a sacrilegious man — who, having abjured the providence and power of the one God which he confessed, is led aside to monstrous superstitions and empty figments? According to the Apostle, far worse a guilty man, and rightly to be condemned, is he who deserts a confessed truth, than one who had in no way ever believed in it; for although the figments which he proposes may be ridiculous, nevertheless his very disposition and will is criminal, and his profession and preaching rightly to be condemned. And on this account, he who wishes a sentence of condemnation to be brought forth without delay against another, in the matter in which he judges another, may know that he is condemning himself.

For ought not the bishop to vindicate against those who commit bodily adultery, and yet not vindicate against those who commit sacrilege — that is, the spiritual fornication and adultery? Did not the Lord Himself, when the adulteress was brought to Him, say to her accusers: If any of you is without sin, let him first cast a stone at her (John 8:7)? He did not say, “If any of you is not likewise an adulterer,” but, “If any of you is without sin”: meaning that anyone bound by sin in any matter would not dare to cast a stone at another for the offense of his sin. To these, then, departing in their own consciences, the Saviour of the world added: Woman, where are thy accusers? Has no one condemned thee? Neither will I condemn thee. Go, and now sin no more (John 8:10–11). You hold and are held; you press and are pressed; you bind and are bound; you demand the bishop’s discussion and you exact the verdict. Remember that every offense must be brought forward against itself. Do not even the human laws say that a guilty man cannot make a guilty man? Why do you see the mote in your brother’s eye, and you do not see the beam in your own eye? (Matt. 7:3) You who accuse adulterers commit adultery, and you make spiritual adulterers out of bodily ones — adulterers indeed!

Do you really demand a discussion? The diligent man, mature, religious, does not wish anyone in the Church to sin; the one who sins, he wishes to be discussed and rightly condemned to penalty; whatever you promise toward another, you will be compelled to bring forth in yourself: for it is this that brings it about that, by the bishop’s negligence, the Church is not accused and stained. Therefore the bishop’s solicitude and severity ought not to be lacking in any wickedness, and the Church’s reputation must be cleansed of every charge. But you may say perhaps that you are a layman, and he a minister of the Church, and so you exaggerate the crime as graver. You speak truly, nor do I deny it: by so much more is he to be carefully examined, by how much more closely placed [in office]; by so much more guilty he is, by how much more he was constituted in that ministry, and ought least to have done these things. Behold, the censure is not lacking: hear thou, and if he be convicted, he will be consequently delivered to vengeance.

Chapter II: That the Layman, Being a Member of the Body of Christ, Shares in the Holy People and Is Not Exempt from the Censure of Sacrilege; and That He Who Has Professed Christ and Returns to the Figments of Paganism Must Abstain from the Sacred Body

Come now: what do you wish concerning yourself? Surely it is not the case that, because you are not in the sacred ministry, you are therefore not in the sacred people? Do you not know that you also are a member of the supreme Pontiff? Are you ignorant that the whole Church is called the Church of priests? Lastly, if he is guilty who, going to the Church’s ministry, transgresses, are you not yourself also guilty, who, after the confession of truth, lead yourself back to depraved and perverse and profane and diabolical things — to which you have professed yourself to renounce — and reduce yourself to figments?

And so even you, after blasphemies openly and publicly poured forth, must in every way abstain from the sacred body. For you cannot share in the table of the Lord and the table of demons; nor can you drink the chalice of the Lord and the chalice of demons (1 Cor. 10:21). Nor can you be the temple of God and the temple of the devil: light and darkness cannot meet together in you. I shall see whether you press, and call to vindicate against another’s malefice. You, however, cannot decline the weight of your own sin: and by how much you do not allow the offense to pass unpunished in another, by so much you must show that, by the same measure, the same is to be done in you.

Yet in your blasphemies themselves, by which you are justly to be struck, I plainly recognize your ignorance — for, as the saying goes, “to have the will to lie, but not the art of feigning” — that, since you understand yourself to have an evil disposition and a perverse purpose of apostasy, in such a way that nothing whatsoever may supply you with the matter of that vanity, nor are you able to construct what you conceive in your heart and bring forth from your mouth. Tell me, when it is read often enough in the Roman histories — Livy being the author — that very often in this same city, with pestilence arising, infinite thousands of men perished, and that for that reason it was so frequent that scarcely could there be found those of whom in those warlike times the army might be made up: was it then that sacrifice was least offered to your god February? Or did this one cult here profit nothing at all in those times when the Lupercalia was being celebrated? Nor indeed will you say that this rite did not yet then exist, since it is reported to have been brought from Evander into Italy before Romulus.

Why the Lupercalia were instituted, however — to the extent that pertains to the figments of that very superstition — Livy speaks of it in the second decade. He does not record that they were instituted for the purpose of warding off diseases, but on account of the sterility of women, which had then occurred — to be exhibited (as he thinks) — or rather, perhaps, to be exacted. Wherefore, if it should avail anything for this — when this has been discontinued — it is not against diseases that diseases will have come about, against which the Lupercalia were not invented, but for the sterility of women, on account of whose fecundity these things were devised. Tell me, what will you say of pestilence, of sterility, of the continual storm of wars? Have these things therefore come to pass on account of the Lupercalia being abolished? But if the Lupercalia were not given for these things, either to be averted or to be remedied, why are you tossed about in vain agitation?

Chapter III: That the Lupercalia Did Not Protect Rome from Plague Even in the Days of Its Celebration; That the Provinces Which Never Practiced It Have Suffered the Same Calamities; and That the Misfortunes of the Roman People Have Come from the Corruption of Their Morals, Not from the Discontinuance of a Pagan Rite

If indeed it had any such power, when it was discontinued, no disease would have arisen against which the Lupercalia were not invented; rather, women would by no means have been able to bear children, for whose fecundity these things have been devised. What will you say about plague, about sterility, about the continual storm of wars? Have these things therefore come to pass on account of the Lupercalia having been abolished? But if the Lupercalia were not given for these things — neither to be averted, nor to be remedied — why are you tossed about in vain agitation?

What of Tuscia, what of Aemilia, and the other provinces, in which scarcely any man at all has remained, that they have been consumed by the necessity of war? Was it the discontinuance of the Lupercalia that caused this — those provinces which were laid waste long before the Lupercalia were taken away? When the Emperor Anthemius came to Rome, the Lupercalia was indeed being celebrated; and yet so great a pestilence crept in that it was scarcely to be borne. Was it through Campania that the Lupercalia was conducted, where, when it was taken away, diseases and pestilence were generated there? But you will say that all things pertain to Rome as to the head, and what was not done here, was felt in the various provinces pertaining to her. Why then, before these provinces pertained to Rome, did they flourish by their own resources, without the Lupercalia? That sterility of the lands, you say, the abolished Lupercalia has caused — or has it come from the merits of our sins? Of which it has been said long ago, that whatever the Romans had deserved, they would lose by their morals; and the sterility of women, in some certain manner, was bound to come about — on account of which the Lupercalia is said to have been instituted, not the sterility of the lands, on account of which the Lupercalia was not instituted, to be removed.

What of Africa, whence sterility comes? What of Gaul? Did the Lupercalia institute these things — or our own habits, thefts, homicides, adulteries, injustices, iniquities, ambitions, cupidities, perjuries, false testimonies, oppressions of the wretched, the assault on good causes and the defense of bad ones, and in all these unheard-of perversities; lastly — and what is above all — minds devoted to demons, sacrileges, and even the magic arts dreadful to pagans themselves? Behold what does all things adverse and hostile to us — not the Lupercalia, which were taken away for your salvation. But what do you say, you yourselves, who defend the Lupercalia and propose that they ought to be celebrated? You yourselves cheapen them; you yourselves render their cult and celebration vile and common.

If the showing of the Lupercalia has procured what is contrary to us, the fault is yours; for what you suppose to be of singular benefit to you, you most negligently — and not with a cult and devotion approaching even the unequal — you have led down to vile and trivial persons, base and abject. Apud illos enim — among them, the ancients — the noble men themselves used to run, and the matrons publicly were beaten with their bodies bared. You therefore are the first to have offended in the Lupercalia: it would have been better not to act than to celebrate these things with such an injury; but you have led down the cult that is to be venerated by you — which you think to be salutary — to vile and trivial persons, abject and lowly.

If you really, then, profess this rite to be sacred — or rather an execrable thing — to be salutary to you, do you yourselves run, do you yourselves run naked with the goatskin loincloth in the manner of your forefathers, that you may rightly perform the laughingstocks of your salvation. If they are great, if they are divine, if they are salutary, if upon these the integrity of your life depends, why are you ashamed to do them through your own selves? If it is shameful and a disgrace, are you not yourselves confessing that the very thing you say is salutary and is destined to be of divine profit, is itself a disgrace? No man professes a religion which by itself, when carried out to its end, he blushes at and flees from; your very shame ought to teach you that this thing is a public crime, not a salvation. And it is not a worship of the Divinity, of which no wise man is ashamed, but the instruments of depravity — by which your minds, bringing forth a testimony against themselves, blush to fulfill what they profess ought to be done.

Chapter IV: That the Lupercalia Are an Open Worship of Demons; That the Castors Did Not Save Their Patrons from Calamity Either; and That Patronage of the Festival Is a Pretext for Refusing Moral Accountability by Ascribing Sin to Fate

If it shames you to celebrate such things — is what is said to be salutiferous and divinely profitable that very thing which you yourselves confess to be a disgrace? No one professes a religion which by itself, when carried out to its end, he blushes at and flees from; let your very modesty teach you that this is a public crime, not a salvation, and not a worship of the Divinity (of which no wise man is ashamed), but the instruments of depravities — by which your minds, bringing forth a testimony against themselves, blush to fulfill what they profess ought to be performed.

Your Castors, certainly, from whose cult you were unwilling to desist — why have they not provided you favorable seas, that in the time of winter ships with grain might come here, and the city be not laboring under want? Or, if it is to come about in the days following — that this is to be of the summer — is it a benefit constituted by God, not the empty persuasion of the Castors?

Tell us, neither Christians nor pagans, perfidious everywhere, faithful nowhere, corrupt everywhere, sound nowhere — you who can hold neither one nor the other, when each is contrary to the other!

Tell me, I say, you patrons of the Lupercalia — and indeed, defenders of the laughingstock of the Divinity, of base songs, fitting masters of unsoundness, who not without cause have minds that are not sound — worthy of this religion, which is celebrated with the words of obscenities and crimes. You shall yourselves see what salvation is at hand for you, which proposes such a stain and pernicion to morals. Nor is it the case that you should say “by doing these things and broadcasting the crimes of every man we deter minds from such commissions, and we restrain them by shame, lest these things be sung in the public voice”; when, as that one says, these laughingstocks are seen not so much to deter as to admonish minds, and as he himself said: they take rage and souls from the crime; thence made more shameless, by the fact of the publicized crime, and modesty exposed, nothing remains at all of which one might be ashamed, nor has he what he might fear to have made public — but he now confidently sets himself forth, whatever he is, in the open, not by the act of correction, but rather by a kind of joy and celebration: now of every name, every person, every standing of life, every religion, however infamous, the deeds are told in song; and unless they be accompanied by the chanting of crimes, festal occasions are not held.

Tell us, therefore, you who hold the will of profanity, the causes of which you cannot allege — you who have proposed yourselves to defend the falsity that you cannot defend: what will you say of drought, of hail, of whirlwind, of storms, and the various calamities, which come about for the quality of our morals? Have these things also come about because the Lupercalia have been taken away — or are they inflicted on evil habits to be chastened by deserved retributions? But what is not strange about men is that they wish these things to come about not by divine judgment but by the inroads of vain superstition — so that they may cover their crimes and misdeeds with their authority, and bring forth the heavens, the stars, and a fated error to be applied; and a necessity of sinning, and a malefic conduct, may proceed not from the perversity of their own heart, but depend on heaven as its author. Set forth, therefore, for what evils to be removed, or for what goods to be merited, your Lupercalia have been instituted; and let us see what those goods may have come about, when the Lupercalia were carried on, and what evils have come, when the Lupercalia have been taken away.

Chapter V: That Rome Was Captured by the Gauls, Sacked by Alaric, and Overthrown by the Civil Strife of Anthemius and Ricimer All While the Lupercalia Was Being Celebrated; That the Festival Therefore Cannot Have Been the Cause of Recent Calamities; and That the Question Is Not the Image but the Reality of Pagan Worship

Let it be reckoned, and what evils have come about when the Lupercalia is seen to have been taken away. Stand firm: at what destruction of yours do you say these prodigies were discovered? Worthy is he who, knowing not what monstrous mixture of beast and man (compounded I know not how, whether truly or feignedly published) is to be celebrated.

If, to pass over older things, you say that the pestilence ought to be removed by the Lupercalia — behold, before they were taken away in my own times, that there was a grievous pestilence of men and beasts in the City and in the fields is not in doubt. If you boast about sterility, why do these things happen in Africa or in the Gauls, where neither were the Lupercalia ever, nor is it certain that they were taken away? Why does the East now abound and overflow with the supplies of all things, which neither has ever celebrated the Lupercalia, nor celebrates them? Or do you say that they injured there, where for very many ages they had been celebrated, and were taken away suddenly?

Let us see, therefore, whether in those times in which you say it was practiced rightly and in its full vigor, as it appears to you — when devotion was complete, never has there been famine, never has pestilence at all existed. But if it has very often come to the extremity of peril by these calamities, it appears that the Lupercalia have profited nothing in the warding off of these evils; and even at that time when, as you say, it was carried on with proper order: thus it has been provided in each particular need that you say it has been provided for. If, however, it has not stood thus, the persuasion of this remedy is shown to be vain.

Why now do you experience whether they may avail anything, even rightly celebrated? And do you yourselves run about through these laughingstocks, after the manner of your forefathers, that as a divine and salutary thing — as you yourselves say — by celebrating it more devoutly, you may better and better look to your own salvation? When these things were being celebrated, was Rome not captured by the Gauls? And did she not very often come to extremes? Did she not collapse during civil wars under this same celebration? Were the Lupercalia lacking when Alaric overthrew the City? And recently, when she was overthrown by the civil fury of Anthemius and Ricimer — where were the Lupercalia? Why have they least of all profited these men?

Surely it is divine: if it is salutary to you, why is it not done by you yourselves, that your forefathers may do these things? Why do you diminish the causes of your salvation? Why do you discolor it? Why do you wear it down? Why do you reduce it to whatever vile things? Why do you reproach us when you yourselves trample on your own remedies? It is better not to attempt than to perform contemptuously: certainly your forefathers, if it appeared to them in vicious form, were leading the matter to be that some sacred thing might be celebrated, restored. Why have you not led it back to that standard, but have brought it down to a vicious cult, executing it through unworthy persons of every kind, with corrupt restoration, that you might more fully and more perfectly handle the causes of your salvation? Why are you ashamed to act, if it is salutary? If it is divine, what disgrace is it to have handled it?

But you say that even the image of the thing itself ought not to be disturbed. If it profits, if it is salutary, why not the thing itself rather than its image? But if it certainly profited nothing then, when it was carried on by the entire rite — as you say it was — and is now being treated, and you ask of what use the image of it is, of which you yourselves recognize that the very thing did not profit: stand firm at the place to which you say your destruction has come, that you should call these prodigies to have been discovered, worthy that one know not what mixed compound of beast and man — whether truly or falsely brought forth — you should celebrate.

Chapter VI: That No Christian May Celebrate the Lupercalia, but Pagans Alone (If Any) May Perform It; That Many Pagan Practices Have Been Abolished by Successive Pontiffs at Various Times; and That the Recent Failures of the Empire Are Themselves Evidence That Toleration of These Rites Has Not Protected Rome

But you say that a matter carried on for so many ages ought not to be excluded. None the less, the superstition of paganism has been ventilated for many ages: let sacrifice be offered in the temples of demons, and a profane vanity be celebrated in the Capitol! Why do you defend a portion, when greater things are passed over? If many kinds of vain practices are proven to have been abolished by various ages, why may not even a portion, ventilated for any length of time, be taken away? If the matter is settled by length of time, since the time imputed to your forebears, who have not lived by this prescription of time, can be brought up — then it is possible that what is superfluous and ought to be removed is to be set aside, even when greater and more numerous things have already been removed. Indeed they have shown this themselves.

But you say that even in Christian times these things have been done; nay rather, that for a long time among the Christians they have been celebrated. Surely they have not been removed under the first bishops of the Christian religion, and on this account ought not to have been taken away under their successors? Many things have been abolished by various pontiffs at different times as harmful, or cast aside. Not all things at once does the medicine of the body cure the languors, but what it sees the more dangerous to be threatening; lest either the matter of the body should not suffice for the medicine, or for the mortal condition all things at once cannot be averted.

Inquire of what kind it is whence you act: if it is good, if it is divine, if it is salutary, deservedly whensoever it ought not to have been taken away. If it is neither salutary, nor divine, the cause must rather be alleged for you why it is taken away more slowly, when what is superstitious is established, and what is empty, ought not to suit Christian profession — manifestly is it. Lastly, as far as pertains to me: let no baptized person, no Christian celebrate this; let only the pagans, whose rite this is, perform it. It befits Christians to declare that these things are pernicious and pestilential, undoubtedly to be regarded as existing.

Why do you charge me, if I declare that what you profess to be hostile must be removed from the partners of the Christian profession? I, certainly, shall absolve my conscience: let those see to it who shall have neglected to obey just admonitions. What — that even my predecessors perhaps did this, I do not doubt; and they attempted to act upon it before the imperial ears: but that they were not heard is clear, since these evils still endure. And on this account those very imperial governments have failed; even the name of the Romans, with the Lupercalia not yet removed, has come to the most extreme calamities. And therefore now I urge that those things be removed which I know to have been of no profit, and indeed to have existed as harmful, contrary to the true religion. Lastly, if from the persona of my predecessors you should reckon that prescription is to be made, each one of us shall render account of his own administration, even as is provided for in public dignities.

I do not dare to accuse the negligence of my predecessors, since I rather believe perhaps that they attempted that this depravity be removed, and that there existed certain causes and contrary wills, which should impede their intentions — even as also you do not now consider that you shall desist from these insane endeavors.

Source/Reference

Notes / Historical Commentary

The Tractate Against Andromachus is one of the most distinctive documents in the entire Gelasian corpus and one of the most historically illuminating texts of the late fifth-century Roman Church. It stands apart from the Acacian-Schism material — Letters VIII, XIV, XV, and the Tomus de anathematis vinculo — in that it is not a doctrinal treatise on the relations of sees, nor a letter to a foreign bishop, nor a piece of high ecclesiastical diplomacy. It is the bishop of Rome addressing a faction within his own city, exercising pastoral discipline against the senatorial aristocracy on a matter of domestic religious order. Where the Acacian material shows the Roman bishop acting in his universal-jurisdictional capacity over the great patriarchal sees, the present treatise shows him acting in his episcopal capacity over the Christian community of his own diocese. The two registers are complementary; both belong to the office; and the project’s audience is well served by reading them together.

The historical occasion is precise. Around the year 494 — perhaps slightly earlier or later — a circle of Roman senators led by one Andromachus had revived, or sought to revive, the Lupercalia. The festival was the most ancient of Roman religious observances, traditionally held on 15 February, in which young men called Luperci (originally from the highest patrician families, by Gelasius’s day from the lowest social classes) ran nearly naked through the streets of the city striking bystanders — particularly women — with thongs cut from sacrificed goats, in the belief that the blows would induce fertility and ward off sterility. The festival had its origins in pre-Roman Italic religion, was associated with the cave of the Lupercal beneath the Palatine where the she-wolf was said to have suckled Romulus and Remus, and had survived continuously through the entire history of the Roman state. It was, in cultural-symbolic terms, the festival of Rome itself.

By Gelasius’s pontificate the festival had become a kind of paradox. Rome had been Christian in name for over a century. The public structures of paganism — sacrifices, oracles, the great state cults — had been suppressed by the Theodosian legislation of the 380s and 390s. But certain festivals, particularly those tied to civic identity rather than to specific deities, had survived in attenuated form, performed by professional entertainers and watched by senatorial patrons who were, on parchment, baptized Christians. The Lupercalia was the most prominent of these survivals. Andromachus and his circle wished to defend it — perhaps to revive it in a fuller form — on the explicit ground that recent calamities (plague, sterility, military disaster, even the catastrophic events of the fifth century) had followed upon its neglect. Gelasius’s response is the present tractatus, addressed not as a private letter but as a public refutation of the senatorial position. The treatise is therefore both a polemic against named opponents and a piece of public episcopal teaching for the whole Christian community of Rome.

The architecture of the treatise is rhetorical-cumulative rather than systematic. Chapter I opens with a sharp denunciation of the senatorial circle’s manner of argument — they presume to teach without learning, accuse without knowing, judge without examining — and then takes up Andromachus’s specific charge that the Roman bishop has been a slothful censor of vice. Gelasius accepts the framing: yes, the bishop is responsible for the discipline of the Church; that is precisely why he is now writing. He proceeds to identify what is, in his view, the real spiritual fornication at issue: the senators’ patronage of pagan rites under Christian profession. The chapter ends with the bishop’s sollicitudo over the integrity of the Roman Church articulated as obligation. This is the same sollicitudo language that appears throughout the Leonine and Gelasian corpora as the term for the Roman bishop’s universal pastoral responsibility, here turned to the specific case of his episcopate over the city itself.

Chapter II contains what is, for the project’s purposes, the most striking single act in the treatise: the formal exclusion of Andromachus from the Eucharist. A sacro corpore modis omnibus abstinendus es — “you must in every way abstain from the sacred body” — uses the gerundive of obligation that signals not pastoral advice but the imposition of canonical discipline. The doctrinal warrant Gelasius cites is 1 Corinthians 10:21: one cannot share both the table of the Lord and the table of demons. This is exactly the warrant the medieval canonists would later invoke for personal interdict, and the present passage is one of the earliest documented instances of the discipline being applied to a named layman of senatorial rank. The reader is watching the practice take shape in real time. The chapter also contains a careful theological argument that the laity, as members of Christ’s body and partakers in the universal priesthood of 1 Peter 2:9, are not exempt from ecclesiastical discipline; the senatorial circle’s appeal to lay status as a defense against the bishop’s correction is denied at the root.

Chapters III through V are the empirical-historical heart of the treatise. The senators have made a factual claim — that the abolition of the Lupercalia caused recent public calamities. Gelasius takes the claim apart with three lines of evidence. First, the regional argument: Tuscia, Aemilia, Africa, and Gaul have suffered the same calamities, but did not have the Lupercalia to lose. Second, the historical argument: Rome was struck by plague during the reign of Anthemius, when the festival was being celebrated; she was sacked by the Gauls in 387 B.C., she suffered through the civil wars of the late Republic, she was sacked by Alaric in 410, and she was overthrown by the Ricimer–Anthemius civil war of 472 — every catastrophe in eight centuries of Roman history occurred while the Lupercalia was being observed. Third, the moral-causal argument: the calamities are due to Roman vice, not to the absence of pagan ritual; and the Lupercalia, far from being a remedy for moral decay, is itself one of the principal occasions of that decay, since the festival had become an annual carnival of public obscenity. The argument is empirical and the historical record is on Gelasius’s side; the senatorial position has no factual ground on which to stand.

The most theologically interesting moment in the middle of the treatise is the diagnostic sentence in Chapter IV: Dicite nobis nec Christiani, nec pagani, ubique perfidi, nusquam fideles, ubique corrupti, nusquam integri — “Tell us, neither Christians nor pagans, perfidious everywhere, faithful nowhere, corrupt everywhere, sound nowhere.” Gelasius is naming the senatorial circle’s theological status precisely. They are not honest pagans; they are not honest Christians; they have made a religion of personal convenience by combining the social dignities of Christian society with the patronage of pagan rites. The position they occupy is what we might call religious bricolage: the externals of each tradition deployed as it suits, with no underlying commitment to either. Gelasius will not allow them the comforting category of “civic Romans” or “religious moderates”; he names the position as perfidia — the betrayal of every commitment they have made. The diagnosis is sharp, but it is also charitable in a precise sense: it tells the senators what they actually are, so that they may, if they will, become something else.

The closing chapter contains the most significant material for the project’s purposes. Three passages deserve particular attention. First, the formal generalization of the disciplinary action: nullus baptizatus, nullus Christianus hoc celebret, et soli hoc pagani, quorum ritus est, exsequantur — “let no baptized person, no Christian celebrate this; let only the pagans, whose rite this is, perform it.” The personal interdict imposed on Andromachus in Chapter II is now applied to the whole Christian community of Rome. The bishop is exercising his pastoral office over the entire baptized population of the city; rank and standing do not exempt. The provision that pagans alone (if any remain) may perform the rite is sharp: Gelasius is in effect telling the senators that to perform the festival they must first apostatize, since no Christian can. Second, the famous discharge of conscience: Ego certe absolvam conscientiam meam: ipsi videant, qui justis admonitionibus obedire neglexerint — “I, certainly, shall absolve my conscience: let those see to it who shall have neglected to obey just admonitions.” This is one of the foundational formulae of Roman pastoral discipline. The verb absolvam does not mean “I shall give absolution” in the sacramental sense but “I shall discharge” or “complete the obligations of”; the bishop’s conscience is discharged by the faithful performance of his pastoral duty, regardless of the response of those admonished. The principle would be canonized in the later medieval maxim of triple admonition, after which responsibility for any consequence falls on the recipient. Its biblical roots are Acts 20:26 (Paul’s “I am pure from the blood of all men”) and Ezekiel 33:1–9 (the watchman who has given warning is innocent of the blood of those who do not heed).

Third, the continuity-with-predecessors argument made explicit by Gelasius himself: Multa sunt quae a singulis pontificibus diverso tempore sublata sunt noxia, vel abjecta — “Many things have been removed by various pontiffs at different times as harmful, or cast aside.” Gelasius positions his action against the Lupercalia within a generational chain of pastoral work by the Roman bishops; the abolition is not his innovation but his fulfillment of a task long under way. He goes further: quod etiam praedecessores meos forsitan fecisse non ambigo, et apud imperiales aures haec submovenda tentasse — “which I do not doubt that my predecessors also perhaps did, and that they attempted to remove these things in the imperial ears.” The earlier Roman bishops, in Gelasius’s understanding, had themselves attempted to persuade the imperial authorities to abolish the Lupercalia; they were not heard; the empire that could not bring itself to reform its public religion was the empire that could not save itself. The argument is historically striking: Gelasius is saying that the persistence of the Lupercalia at Rome is itself evidence of the moral and religious failure that brought about the collapse of the Western imperial government. The Roman bishops did their pastoral part by raising the issue; the emperors failed to act; the consequences have been visible. The reader will note the implicit theology of providence operating through history: the empire’s fate has tracked its religious response to its bishops’ admonitions.

For the question of papal primacy that the project’s audience is engaged with, the Tractate Against Andromachus shows the Roman bishop’s office in a register distinct from the Acacian material but continuous with it. The same sollicitudo that operates over the universal Church in the letters to the Eastern bishops operates here over the Christian community of Rome itself. The same authority that nullifies Canon 28 of Chalcedon and condemns Acacius of Constantinople here imposes personal interdict on a Roman senator and forbids the Lupercalia to all the baptized. The same continuity-with-predecessors that is implicit in the conciliar reception arguments of the Tomus is here made explicit by Gelasius himself in a domestic-pastoral context. The bishop of Rome, in Gelasius’s understanding, is responsible for the integrity of his own diocese as well as for the integrity of the universal Church; both are aspects of one office, and both are exercised in continuity with what predecessors have done. The Acacian material shows the office in its ecumenical mode; the present treatise shows it in its episcopal mode. Reading them together gives a fuller picture of what the late-fifth-century Roman bishop took his office to be.

The treatise also rewards reading as a piece of historical evidence about the religious sociology of late-fifth-century Rome. The senatorial circle Gelasius is addressing was not a tiny eccentric faction; it was a substantial body of the Roman aristocracy, men of consular rank or of senatorial families with inherited religious investments in the old festivals. Their argument was not crude — they had a coherent civic-religion case that the externals of pagan observance could be retained without their substance, and that the historical association of these festivals with Rome itself made them part of the city’s identity rather than part of any one religious commitment. Gelasius’s response is, in effect, a comprehensive refutation of civic-religion theory: the externals of worship are themselves worship; the soul that participates in the form is implicated in what the form represents; and no Christian polity can sustain itself by combining Christian profession with the patronage of rival cults. The argument has clear application to questions of religious accommodation in any era. The principle Gelasius articulates — that what is given in worship is given to the deity whose worship it is, regardless of the worshipper’s stated intention — is one of the foundational principles of the Western Christian tradition’s stance on liturgical and ceremonial matters.

One observation is owed to the editor of the PL text. The opening footnote of this work preserves the editor’s candid assessment: Hunc Gelasii tractatum cum editione Mansi diligenter collatum damus, in multis tamen intricatum, et perobscurum, ut ipse lector facile sentiet — “We give this tractate of Gelasius diligently collated with the Mansi edition, although in many places it is intricate and very obscure, as the reader will easily perceive.” The reader is therefore advised that some passages in the work are acknowledged-difficult in the Latin tradition itself, and the present translation has preserved the difficulty rather than smoothing it conjecturally where the manuscript transmission is uncertain. The substance of the argument is not in doubt at any of the difficult points; what is uncertain is, at most, the precise rhetorical phrasing of one or two transitional passages. The treatise’s force as a piece of episcopal pastoral discipline, and its significance as evidence of the late-fifth-century Roman bishop’s understanding of his office, are not affected.

The Early Church and Peter's Primacy