The Early Church and Peter's Primacy

Letter XIII, from Pope Gelasius to the Bishops of Dardania

Synopsis: Gelasius writes to the bishops of Dardania to demonstrate that Acacius was rightly condemned by the sole judgment of the Apostolic See — grounding his answer in the primacy Peter received from the Lord’s voice, by virtue of which the First See confirms every synod by her own authority, has the right to loose what has been bound by any bishops’ sentences, to judge the whole Church, and to be judged by none; from her, no one is permitted to appeal.

Gelasius, bishop of the city of Rome, to the [bishops of] Dardania.

Chapter I: The Astonishment at the Question; The Eutychian Communicators Have Nothing to Say

We are greatly astonished that your dilection desires to know — as though it were a new and, as it were, a difficult question, and still as though it were something unheard of — that which the communicators of the Eutychian pestilence, having nothing to answer on behalf of the obstinacy of their perdition, having now been convicted by frequent reasoning, murmur in their wretched contention: not because there is any weight in what they babble, but because they can find nothing at all to say. In which We wonder the more that those formed in Catholic understanding still hesitate, than at those who have fallen from the truth and have deviated from the ancient tradition of the Church, and put forth the profane novelties of words (1 Tim. 6:20) and the ineptitudes of fleeting perversity — which your dilection has reported that they are boasting about: namely, that they think Acacius was not rightly condemned because he does not appear to have been deposed by a special synod; and moreover they heap up the madness of their vanity, childishly adding — especially since he was the bishop of the royal city.

Chapter II: A Heresy Once Condemned Binds All Who Communicate with It — Sabellius, Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius, Nestorius

Wherefore, spitting out the stupidity of vain complaints, you ought to run through [the tradition] from the blessed apostles themselves, and consider prudently that Our fathers, the Catholic and learned bishops, in whatever heresy has at any time been raised up, have willed that whatever — on behalf of the truth, on behalf of Catholic and apostolic communion, according to the course of the Scriptures and the preaching of the elders — they once sanctioned in an assembly gathered together, should thereafter stand unshaken and firm; nor have they permitted, by any fresh presumption, what had been fixed beforehand to be revisited in the same case — most wisely foreseeing that, if it were permitted to anyone to repeat what had been wholesomely decreed, no ordinance of the Church would stand firm against each and every error, and every sound definition would always be disturbed by the same furious relapses.

For if, even with the limits of once-established synodal rules prefixed, the crushed plagues do not cease, with renewed battles, to raise themselves against the foundation of truth and to strike every simple heart, what would happen if it were ever permitted to the perfidious to enter a council? For however manifest that truth may be, there is never lacking what pernicious falsity may bring forth — which, though lacking reason or authority, yet does not yield by contentiousness alone. Our elders, perceiving these things by divine inspiration, necessarily took precaution — that what a synod convened against any heresy had promulgated on behalf of the faith, communion, and Catholic and apostolic truth, they would not allow thereafter to be mutilated by fresh revisitings, lest a grave occasion be given for striking at what had been medicinally established; but, once the author of any madness and his error had been condemned together, they judged it sufficient that whoever at any time should be a communicator of this error should be bound by the principal sentence of his condemnation — since anyone can manifestly be recognized either by his profession or by his communion.

And that we may pass over the earlier examples (for the sake of brevity), which a diligent inquirer may easily trace: a synod condemned Sabellius; nor was it necessary, that his followers might afterwards be condemned, for individual synods to be held one by one, but according to the tenor of the ancient constitution, the universal Church held that all who became participants either of his wickedness or of his communion were to be repudiated. Thus, on account of the blasphemies of Arius, the form of the faith and of Catholic communion, set forth at the Council of Nicæa, without any revisiting, concluded [the condemnation of] all Arians, or whoever had fallen into this plague either by consent or by communion. Thus a synod once held, condemning Eunomius, Macedonius, Nestorius, did not permit [their followers] to come to new councils; but the Church, by the synodal limit handed on to her, repudiated all who in any manner relapsed into these associations; nor was it ever manifestly right to yield — no matter what necessity compelled — by new audacities, to profane what had been wholesomely established. For in the storm of the Arian persecution too, many Catholic priests — released from exile when peace was restored, catching their breath — composed the disturbed Churches with their Catholic brethren in such a way that they did not change anything of what that Nicene Synod had defined concerning the Catholic and apostolic faith and communion, nor did they strike anyone fallen with a new condemnation, but by the tenor of that decree they judged those who had not repented to be condemned.

Chapter III: No See Confirms Synods as the First Does — by Virtue of the Primacy Peter Received from the Lord’s Voice

Which things being fittingly weighed from the paternal tradition, We are confident that no one now truly Christian is ignorant of the fact that the ordinance of every synod which the assent of the universal Church has approved must be carried out by no see more than by the first — which both confirms every synod by her own authority, and preserves it by continual moderation, by reason of her primacy — which primacy Blessed Peter the Apostle received by the voice of the Lord, and which (the Church nonetheless following) [the First See] has always held and continues to hold.

Chapter IV: The Apostolic See’s Long Patience with Acacius — Three Years of Warning, the Episcopal Legation, the Summons to the First See’s Judgment

While [the Apostolic See] had learned from certain indications that Acacius had deviated from Catholic communion, long disbelieving these things — since She had known him often to have been the executor of her necessary disposition against heretics — for nearly three years She did not cease to admonish him by letters dispatched, as the writings frequently sent through various [messengers] testify. When he, with the silence he owed, for a long time refused to respond, an episcopal legation also was sent, and nonetheless a page was dispatched which would warn him to remember first his own deeds, and that he ought to look back at what he had formerly labored for on behalf of the Catholic faith. [The Apostolic See] called him to witness — alike coaxing and threatening — that he should not cut himself off from the body of Catholic unity; and at the same time, since John, the bishop of the Second See, had been pressing him with grave accusations, [the Apostolic See] exhorted him to the hearing of the First See — that he ought either to come or to send. For although a synod was not to be repeated, yet it was fitting that the bishop of any city should not evade the judgment of the First See, to which the bishop of the Second See had come — who could not be heard except by the First See, especially one who, with prejudiced minds, had not been excluded by any synod on the part of the Greeks; who could not — and ought not — plead his cause at all even among them, since one superior could not be examined by inferior bishops except by the First See (as has been said), or, if reason so required, condemned — [all the more] since all the Eastern bishops had fallen with Acacius himself into communion with Peter [Mongus], a Catholic bishop of the Second See was in no way to be judged by men of external communion.

Chapter V: Acacius Polluted the Apostolic Legation, Relapsed into Peter Mongus’s Communion, and Convicted Himself by His Own Letters

But Acacius not only disdained to satisfy the demands, but also caused the very legation of the Apostolic See — deceived by blandishments, gifts, and perjuries, by which he promised it, along with the emperor, that the full cause of the Apostolic Bishop concerning all matters would be preserved — to return polluted by Peter [Mongus]’s communion; so despising the power of the Apostolic See that not only did he not yield to her authority, but rather endeavored, through his own envoys, to draw [the legation] into the fellowship of external communion; and it became necessary for the Apostolic See to deprive those very priests whom She had sent of both honor and communion, lest She appear infected by such contagion, and might sufficiently demonstrate that She did not specially hate the person of Acacius but was spurning the covenants of the perished — which She would fittingly abhor even in her own bishops. And nonetheless Acacius had indicated in his own letters that he had most promptly relapsed, without consultation of the same Apostolic See, into the communion of Peter of Alexandria — whom, with the Apostolic See’s authority having been sought, he himself too as executor had condemned — and was conveying in his own speech the accusation of John and the praises of Peter.

Concerning these matters, if indeed he was confident in his case, he ought rather either to have come or to have sent, so that he might have been able to confute John, [when] present, about the lies he was telling, and might reasonably have alleged the praises of Peter he had recounted. Since he did no such thing, he has shown sufficiently that he could neither convict John nor have confidence in fully establishing that Peter had been lawfully received, and he manifested only his purpose of lacerating Catholics and praising heretics; and taught that he was rather a participant with those whom he praised than a partner of the Catholics whom he was attempting to blacken. Thus he himself passed judgment on himself when, polluted by the communion of a condemned man, he became a sharer of his condemnation. So the Apostolic See omitted nothing as regards necessary diligence, and Acacius, according to the form of the Synod of Chalcedon — by which the error to which he communicated was crushed — as it is written of a heretical man, appeared to have been condemned by his own judgment; and justly the Apostolic See — which by all means remembers that She condemned Peter of Alexandria and did not loose him, lest through Acacius’s former communion She should fall into the fellowship of Peter himself, with whom Acacius had communicated — competently removed Acacius from her communion.

Chapter VI: Acacius Refused the Judgment of the First See to Which the Bishop of the Second See Had Come

Wherefore, whether Acacius communicated with the error or the transgression, what need was there to know by a new discussion — when he had already confessed in his own letters; and, as it is written, “By thy mouth thou shalt be justified, and by thy mouth thou shalt be condemned” (Matt. 12:37), he was being held by the bonds of his own words, both guilty and justly to be punished. Why did he, in a new cause preceded by no synod, disdain to confute in the judgment of the First See of the Blessed Apostle Peter, John — whom he was attacking in his own letters, [a bishop] of the Second See whatever sort he may have been — and disdain either to come or to send in order to plead his cause (whether in person or through another) — holding it unworthy, [though he was] the bishop of whatever city, to come to the judgment of the First See, to which he saw the bishop of the Second See had come — that which Anatolius, bishop of the city of Constantinople, is shown to have done by sending legations on his own behalf?

Behold, even in this regard the complainers have no voice: behold, I say, he was called to a lawful examination, where he might defend his case with just pleas — [but] if he shunned the examination of the Apostolic See in investigating the business of John, the Catholic bishop, how would the Apostolic See have followed Acacius’s judgment concerning the reception of Peter the heretic, who had been loosed by her own authority? Would it befit the Apostolic See to await the judgment of the parish of the Heraclean Church — that is, of the Constantinopolitan bishop — or of any others, who were to be gathered together with him or on his account? When the Constantinopolitan bishop was shunning the apostolic hearing of the same First See — who, even if he had been supported by the right of a metropolitan, and even if he had a place among the sees, yet had no right to refuse the examination of the First See, to which, according to the canons, he was being summoned in the cause of our [bishops] at the appeal of the bishop of the Second See — by this very fact he sufficiently showed himself to be confessing his guilt: he who disdained to attend the lawful judgment of the apostolate; nor could it be further delayed, lest — with his old communion yet continuing, since he had now associated himself with the external [communion] — the Apostolic See too might be polluted through him by the contagions of the perfidious, and it was fitting that one who was either a transgressor or a contemnor of the competent judgment — one most manifestly despairing of his own business — be excluded from Catholic and apostolic integrity and communion.

If examination is sought here — there was no need of judgment, once he had confessed in his own letters, and called to lawful judgment, feared to appear. If the weight of authority is sought — the tenor of the Synod of Chalcedon, consenting with the Apostolic See, and the execution of that definition, finds him made a communicator of the error there condemned; he likewise appeared there a sharer of the condemnation there prefixed, since the same error which was once condemned along with its author, in any communicator of wicked communion, bears both its execration and its punishment. By this tenor also Timothy Aelurus, and Peter of Alexandria himself — who certainly seemed in some way to have held the Second See — are proven to have been condemned, without a repeated synod, but by the authority of the Apostolic See alone (with Acacius himself even requesting or executing [this]). Now, however, let them teach that Peter was lawfully purged and rightly separated from every contagion of heretics when Acacius communicated with him — if they think Acacius, his communicator, is to be excused in any way. Or if — which is more true — they could not rightly and lawfully prove that Peter had been expiated (on account of which also Acacius dared neither come nor send to the judgment of the Apostolic See): it remains that [Peter] was in communication [with heresy], and whoever communicated with him was infected.

Chapter VII: The See of Peter Has the Right to Loose What Has Been Bound by Any Bishops, to Judge the Whole Church, and to Be Judged by None

We do not keep silent, moreover, about what the whole Church throughout the world knows: that the See of the Blessed Apostle Peter has the right to loose what has been bound by any bishops’ sentences, inasmuch as she has the right to judge concerning the whole Church, and it is permitted to no one to judge of her judgment — since the canons have willed that appeals be made to her from every part of the world, while from her no one is permitted to appeal. Wherefore, since it is quite clear that Acacius had no power to loose one condemned by the Apostolic See’s sentence without any cognizance of the same — let them say by what synod he presumed this, which he could not have been permitted to do even so without the Apostolic See? Of what see is he bishop? Of what metropolitan city is he presider? Is he not of the parish of the Heraclean Church? If it was clearly permitted to him to break the Apostolic See’s sentence without a synod, with no consultation of it sought — was it not likewise permitted to the First See, executing (as was fitting) the decrees of the Synod of Chalcedon, to thrust down such a transgressor by her own authority?

Chapter VIII: The Apostolic See, Following the Custom of the Elders, Has Often Acted Without a Synod — Athanasius, John Chrysostom, Flavian Absolved by Rome Alone; Dioscorus Condemned; Chalcedon Decreed

But neither do we pass this by: that the Apostolic See frequently — as has been said — according to the custom of the elders, even with no preceding synod, has had the power both of absolving those whom a synod had unjustly condemned, and of condemning, with no existing synod, those whom it was fitting [to condemn]. For indeed the Eastern synod had condemned Athanasius of holy memory, whom nonetheless the Apostolic See, by exception, absolved — because She did not consent to the condemnation of the Greeks. Likewise, a synod even of Catholic bishops had certainly condemned John of Constantinople of holy memory, whom in like manner the Apostolic See, even alone — because She did not consent — absolved; and likewise Flavian of holy memory, condemned by a congregation of bishops, She absolved by the same tenor, because the Apostolic See alone did not consent; and rather — [the one] who had been received there — condemned Dioscorus, bishop of the Second See, by her own authority, and, by not consenting, displaced the impious synod, and for the truth decreed alone that the Synod of Chalcedon should be held — in which She alone granted pardon to countless bishops, seeking pardon, who had fallen at the Robber [Council] of Ephesus, and nonetheless by her own authority cast down those remaining in their perfidy. Which [Council] the congregation gathered there for the restoration of truth followed; since just as what the First See had not approved could not stand, so what She judged ought to be condemned, the whole Church received.

Chapter IX: A Badly Held Synod Is Displaced by a Well Held Synod; A Well Held Synod Cannot Be Revisited

Where it is consequently shown also, that a badly held synod — that is, [one held] against the holy Scriptures, against the doctrine of the Fathers, against the ecclesiastical rules, which the whole Church with merit did not receive, and especially the Apostolic See did not approve — both ought to, and can be, changed by a well held synod — that is, [one held] according to the Scriptures, according to the tradition of the Fathers, according to the ecclesiastical rules, brought forth on behalf of the Catholic faith and communion, which the whole Church has received, and which the Apostolic See has especially approved; but a well held synod, in the aforesaid manner, is by no means to be changed by a new synod. Accordingly, if they confess Eutyches a heretic, they will at the same time confess that the synod at Ephesus by which he was received was badly held; and they will consent — whether they wish or not — that, through the well held Synod of Chalcedon, Eutyches and those thinking with him have been rejected as such; and therefore let them know that it has not been permitted to rub up a well held synod with new agitations. But if perhaps they should say that by the same tenor the Ephesine synod also could not be changed, let again the things which we brought forth above be more plainly reconsidered: namely, that a synod not rightly held against the faith, against the truth and Catholic communion, and truly Christian, must in every way be displaced by a lawful synod on behalf of the faith, truth, and Catholic and truly Christian communion; and an unjust synod must be displaced by a just synod. But a good synod, truly Christian, once enacted on behalf of the faith and the truth and Catholic communion, neither can nor ought to be torn up by the iteration of a new synod; but, according to a well held synod rightly established, if anyone should deviate from her course, he is consequently and sufficiently to be struck by her definition, and rightly lies subject to her ordinances, nor is there need that new synods be introduced again through every individual deviator and [every individual] justly to be struck — since from that [synod’s] course, which condemned the author with his error, whoever in any manner and under any title becomes an accomplice of the same error, so as to pollute himself with her contagion, competently becomes also a participant of the same condemnation, and is bound and punished by the punishment of him whose fellowship he preferred to enter.

Chapter X: The Constantinople Argument Refuted — The Power of the Secular Kingdom Is One Thing, the Distribution of Ecclesiastical Dignities Another

We have laughed at [the idea] that they wish a prerogative to be compared for Acacius because he was bishop of the royal city. Did the emperor not reside at Ravenna, at Milan, at Sirmium, at Trier, for many periods of time? Did the priests of these cities at any time usurp anything to their dignities beyond the measure anciently allotted to them? Did Acacius, when he excluded from Alexandria John — a man of whatever sort, yet a Catholic ordained by Catholics — and received Peter, already detected and condemned in heresy, without consultation of the Apostolic See, seize this audaciously with any synod even held there? When he drove Calendion from Antioch, and again admitted the heretic Peter [the Fuller], whom he himself had also condemned, without the knowledge of the Apostolic See — is he shown to have done this by any synod? If indeed it is a question of the dignity of cities, the dignity of the priests of the second and Third Sees is greater than that of that city [Constantinople] — which is not only by no means numbered among the [apostolic] sees, but is not even counted among the rights of the metropolitans. For, as you say, the power of the secular kingdom is one thing, the distribution of ecclesiastical dignities another. For just as however small a city does not diminish the prerogative of the present kingdom, so the imperial presence does not change the measure of religious dispensation. Let that city be illustrious by the power of the present empire — religion is firm, free, and advanced under the same [emperor] if, rather, with [the emperor] present, she hold her own measure without any disturbance.

Chapter XI: Marcian, Anatolius, and Probus Refused the Elevation of Constantinople; Chalcedon Was Confirmed by Leo’s Authority

Finally, if they flatter themselves with the imperial presence, and think that from this the person of the Constantinopolitan bishop can be made more powerful, let them hear Marcian, prince of that very city [the Eastern emperor at Chalcedon], who — after he approached as an intercessor for the augmentation of his own city’s priest and could obtain nothing against the rules — pursued Pope Leo of holy memory with the highest praises, because he had suffered by no reasoning the canons’ rules to be violated. Let them hear Anatolius, bishop of that same see, confessing that the Constantinopolitan clergy had attempted such things rather than himself, and saying that the whole matter was placed in the power of the Apostolic Bishop. [Let them hear] Blessed Pope Leo himself, bishop of the Apostolic See, by whose authority the Synod of Chalcedon was confirmed, having emptied, by competent refutation, whatever beyond what had been delegated by him for the Catholic and apostolic faith and communion to be done there — [whatever] appeared to have been attempted by new action, against the Nicene canons, on the occasion of that assembly. And [let them hear] likewise, under Pope Simplicius of holy memory, the legate of the Apostolic See, Probus of holy memory, bishop of the city of Canusa — with the then-reigning emperor Leo petitioning, in his presence — showing that such [elevation] could in no way be attempted, and giving no consent at all to these things. And therefore let them not look to the quality of any city, but fittingly observe the measure of ecclesiastical dispensation firmed by paternal tradition.

Chapter XII: Priestly Judgments Come from Priestly Councils; Acacius Could Have Resisted, as Popes Have Always Resisted Emperors

Let it be said, moreover, that concerning the Alexandrian and Antiochene bishops, the emperor, rather than Acacius, commanded for certain reasons the things that were done. But it befit a Christian prince to listen to the priest — especially the one by whose familiarity and favor he was enjoying — that the just vindication of the same would be enough for the injury and contumely [done to Calendion and John], [provided] the Christian prince should permit the Church’s rules to be preserved; because in both bishops a new cause had arisen, and [the new cause] consequently required a new discussion; and — as had always been the case (and as the divine and human laws alike decreed) — that judgments concerning priests should proceed from a priestly council; that bishops of whatever sort, even if an error attached to them humanly, yet not exceeding religion, should not be seen to be cast down by secular power. Were these not still to be suggested to the prince by just reasoning? Exalted by the honor of the royal city — if he had been made more exalted by that royal city — so much the more constant ought he to have been in suggesting these things. But if, in those things which had to be brought forth for religion, he was contemptible and despised, and either sluggish or lacking the confidence to declare them — in what respect did the royal city make him greater?

The prophet Nathan, openly and publicly, to King David’s face, proclaimed the error committed, did not keep silent that he himself had committed it, and consequently absolved him when he was corrected by confession (2 Sam. 12). Ambrose of blessed memory, priest of the Church of Milan, publicly and openly suspended communion from the Emperor Theodosius the Elder, and brought royal power to penance. Pope Leo of blessed memory (as it is read) freely reproved the Emperor Theodosius the Younger when he was overreaching by the Robber [Council] of Ephesus. Pope Hilarus of holy memory also restricted the Emperor Anthemius with clear voice — when Philotheus the Macedonian, supported by [Anthemius’s] familiarity, wished to introduce into the City [Rome] new conciliables of diverse sects — openly, in the presence of the Blessed Apostle Peter, that this should not be done, so that the same emperor, with the interposition of an oath, promised that those things were not to be done. Likewise Pope Simplicius of holy memory, and after him Pope Felix of holy memory, are known to have frequently chided — not only the tyrant Basiliscus but even the Emperor Zeno himself — with free authority, for these very same excesses. And Zeno could have been bent, had he not been reached by the urging of the Constantinopolitan bishop, who, made a participant of external communion, was already fostering what he had fallen into, preferring to persist in the obstinacy of his transgression than to be healed and return to wholesome things, as the outcome of events itself proved. Behold, recently Eugenius, a great man and distinguished priest, bishop of Carthage, and many Catholic priests with him, steadfastly resisted the raging Honoric, king of the Vandal nation, and enduring every extremity, do not cease even today to resist the persecutors. We Ourselves also, when Odoacer — the barbarian heretic who then held the kingdom of Italy — commanded some things not to be done, by God’s grace have manifestly not obeyed in the least.

But this good man Acacius — excellent priest [as he is supposed] — showed to such an extent both that he could have suggested [things to the emperor] and that he was unwilling to do so, rather made it clear that he was in favor [of what was being done], that the emperor did not keep silent that he had done everything from [Acacius’s] counsel, and [Acacius] himself extolled the emperor with great praises for doing these things; and he betrayed himself as a participant in these deeds. But suppose Calendion removed the emperor’s name [from the diptychs]; suppose John was alleged to have lied to the prince — since these were new causes, ought not a new ecclesiastical discussion to have resulted? Or, those who were said to have sinned against a human emperor were cast down with no synod intervening; yet Acacius — delinquent against God, who is the highest and true Emperor, and striving to mix the sincere communion of the divine mystery with the perfidious — was he not to be expelled, according to the synod by which this perfidy was condemned? What of the innumerable Catholic priests expelled throughout the whole East from their own sees, and heretics without doubt let in? These were certainly new causes, and for these consequently a new synod was owed. Why did it then not come to mind, that in such causes at least a synod of some sort should be asked of the prince to be celebrated, so that priests should not be seen everywhere — by whatever colored judgment — to be excluded against ecclesiastical tradition; not only priests of any city, but metropolitan bishops without hesitation? When Acacius did not resist these things by the suggestion [he could have made], he consented to all by communicating with all who had been substituted as heretics in the place of Catholics: but the Apostle says: “Not only they who do these things, but also they who consent with those who do them,” (Rom. 1:32), are without doubt accounted guilty.

Was it lawful for secular power with Acacius consenting, to perform such acts without any synod (which the very novelty of things demanded), without consultation of the Apostolic See; and was it not lawful for the Apostolic See, according to the tenor of the Synod of Chalcedon, in an old cause and by an old ordinance condemned according to the definition, to expel from her communion Acacius communicating with enemies of the Synod of Chalcedon? But they say: Acacius could not oppose the prince. Why did he oppose Basiliscus when he willed [to oppose him]? Why did he not consent to Zeno himself (lest he should appear to communicate openly — though he did so secretly — with Peter the Antiochene)? Behold, the emperor did not press upon one resisting; behold, he did not bring force upon one unwilling; behold, he yielded manifest contagions to one fleeing: finally — for so long a time, while these things were being done, or were known by him to be about to be done — why did he not hasten to refer to the Apostolic See, from which he knew the care of those regions had been delegated to him? But he became himself the praiser of the deeds before he either warned that such things were about to be attempted, or resisted lest they be attempted. As he had already done under Basiliscus, why did he consent to communicate with all those others who, with the Catholic priests expelled, had been substituted as heretics without doubt in individual cities? Finally, he failed in his own duties and disdained to do what befitted a Catholic priest: did the Apostolic See therefore — [being able to do] what pertained to her — either allow or ought to let this pass?

Chapter XIII: The Italian Congregation Did Not Act as a New Synod But as Participant in the Apostolic Execution; The Sentence Stands and Binds All Who Communicate with It

By whatever manner, therefore, [the Apostolic See] repudiated the accomplice of the heretics, and removed the associate of external communion from her own communion; nor was there need of a new synod, when the form of the ancient ordinance sufficiently prescribed this; nor was it needed that she should make these things known to the bishops of the East — who manifestly did not fail to know, from the expulsion of Catholics, what was being done in the cause of the faith; and, communicating with the substituted heretics, there is no doubt that they consented to such a deed. Behold, they have recognized, in the profession of those who most constantly persevered, what was owed to the Catholic faith and communion. Behold, they have recognized how, by departing from such men — rather, by working against them — Acacius deviated from the Catholic faith and communion, and how they equally have subjected themselves to the same error along with him. Behold, they have recognized for what just causes — on behalf of Catholic and apostolic faith and communion, in which both those who had persevered in it had agreed, and those who opposed the persevering were being taught to be alien from the same — Acacius was removed by the authority of the Apostolic See, to whose examination he was especially summoned and to which he cared neither to come nor to send, [although] he claimed [to be confident] that he might clear himself of all these things.

This sentence, directed at Acacius — even though it is proven to have been brought forth in the name of the Apostolic Bishop alone (to whose lawful power it certainly pertained), and especially since it seemed that it ought to be sent secretly, lest with guards stretched everywhere the salutary disposition, impeded by any difficulties, not be able to have the necessary effect — yet, since with orthodox men cast down everywhere and only heretics and their associates now left in the East (so that either no Catholic bishops remained, or they exercised no liberty), a congregation of many Catholic priests in Italy reasonably recognized that the sentence against Acacius had been brought forth; which congregation of bishops, once made, did not recognize itself against Chalcedon, not as a new synod against the old and first [synod]; but rather, according to the tenor, was made a participant of the apostolic execution of the old ordinance — so that it might sufficiently appear that the Catholic Church and the Apostolic See — because now She could not act elsewhere at all — where She could, and with those She could, omitted nothing whatever that pertained to brotherly dealing on behalf of inviolate and sincere communion. Which things — since all those who are now seen to preside over the Eastern Churches know — for that very reason they shun to repair Christian unity by lawful healing; because they refuse to lay aside the occasion of this dissension, which favors their own ambitions; because without the authority of the Apostolic See they confound the rights of all the Churches on every side — preferring to persist in error rather than to lose the faculty of their presumptions, loving the license of their usurpations more than holding in their hearts the regard for divine judgment.

In which, willy-nilly, it is necessary that they receive what they deserve — both for the neglected sincerity of Catholic faith and communion and for the paternal canons evidently broken — unless, while time still permits, they strive with corrected minds to avoid the perils of this eternal condemnation, so that they might not remain such as those for whom the delivered sentence is insoluble. But withdrawing from such, they will not be held by the same sentence: which, just as it is prefixed as never to be loosed for those persevering in error, so will it be alien to those who have shown themselves immune to the wickedness to be punished. These things we indicate as more than sufficient for the instruction of your dilection, although, if the Lord grants the opportunity, we strive to expound them more broadly — so that every one of the faithful may know that the Apostolic See (God forbid!) has in no wise judged precipitately, and so that perverse improbity may be taught that she has nothing which could justly be opposed. Your dilection will act rightly to make these things which we write known to Catholics and to those thinking contrary alike, so that both the necessary firmness may be given to the sound, and fitting medicine to those unsound in mind.

Given on the Kalends of February, Victor, most illustrious man, being consul.

Source/Reference

Notes / Historical Commentary

Letter XIII is, by almost any measure, one of the most important documents in the entire fifth-century papal corpus for the question of Roman primacy. Its date is February 1, 495 — about five months after Letter XI, to which the Dardanian bishops had evidently responded by asking the question Gelasius now answers: whether Acacius could rightly have been condemned by the Apostolic See alone, without a formal synodal procedure. The answer Gelasius gives is comprehensive. He sets out, in explicit terms, the structural principles of the Roman primacy: that the First See confirms every synod by her own authority; that she may loose what any bishops have bound; that no appeal lies from her judgment; that she may act without a synod and has often done so; and that secular and ecclesiastical orders must not be conflated. The reader who wishes to understand the authority exercised by the mid-fifth-century Roman see will find this letter indispensable.

The immediate occasion of the letter is worth pausing over, because it clarifies what Gelasius is doing and why. After Acacius’s death in 489, Euphemius had succeeded him at Constantinople. Although Euphemius was personally Chalcedonian — indeed he was eventually deposed for that reason — he sought to preserve the unity of the Eastern episcopate by defending Acacius’s posthumous memory and arguing that Acacius had never been properly condemned: there was no ecumenical synod against him, and his name should therefore remain in the sacred diptychs. Euphemius’s argument, skillfully made, threatened to peel the Eastern bishops away from Roman communion; the Dardanian bishops — already inclined toward Rome, as Letter XI’s reception makes clear — wrote to Gelasius with what amounts to the same question Euphemius was posing, asking how Rome would answer it. Letter XIII is accordingly not only a Dardanian pastoral document but a comprehensive Roman public answer to the Constantinopolitan defense of Acacius. This also helps explain the letter’s remarkable length and its evident rhetorical polish: Gelasius knew his answer would circulate. The manuscripts confirm this circulation. The letter is preserved in two recensions — a shorter form (found in the ancient Veronensis and in the canonical codex published by Quesnel) and the longer expanded form (found in the Collectio Avellana and cited by Facundus of Hermiane in the sixth century). Both are considered authentic by the Ballerini brothers, who argue that Gelasius first composed the shorter form and then expanded it for wider circulation — a practice paralleled elsewhere in the late fifth-century papal chancery. The text we translate here is the longer recension.

The opening argument (Chapters II–III) establishes the general ecclesiastical principle before Gelasius applies it to Acacius. A heresy condemned once, by a synod received by the universal Church, binds every later communicator of that heresy by the principal sentence. No new synod is needed for each new accomplice — the Fathers foresaw that endless repetition of synods would destroy the firmness of their ordinances. Gelasius adduces the standard Catholic patristic roll: Sabellius, Arius at Nicæa, Eunomius, Macedonius, Nestorius. None required a fresh synod to condemn his followers; the original decree carried forward. The argument is not Gelasius’s novelty; it is the structural logic of how ecclesiastical discipline had always worked. Acacius is simply a particular instance of a more general pattern: a communicator of the Eutychian error, already condemned at Chalcedon, now falls under that prior definition by his own choice of communion.

But Chapter III contains what may be the most compressed statement of the primacy argument in the whole letter. The ordinance of every synod approved by the universal Church’s assent, Gelasius writes, must be carried out by no see more than by the first — quæ et unamquamque synodum sua auctoritate confirmat, et continuata moderatione custodit, pro suo scilicet principatu, quem beatus Petrus apostolus Domini voce perceptum, Ecclesia nihilominus subsequente et tenuit semper et retinet. Three claims are woven together in this single sentence. The first is that every synod is confirmed by Rome’s authority. The second is that Rome preserves every synod by continuing moderation. The third is that she does both by virtue of her primacy. And the origin of that primacy is given directly: Peter received it by the Lord’s voice (Domini voce perceptum). The Church’s subsequent recognition of it is not constitutive; the Church follows what Christ has already established. The Roman primacy is a direct Christic delegation, witnessed in the Gospel (Matt. 16:18–19) and perpetuated in the Petrine see — as Gelasius states here and as Leo had stated before him.

The center of the letter for the primacy question is Chapter VII. Gelasius writes: sedes beati Petri apostoli jus habeat resolvendi, utpote quod de omni Ecclesia fas habeat judicandi, neque cuiquam de ejus liceat judicare judicio, siquidem ad illam de qualibet mundi parte canones appellari voluerint, ab illa autem nemo sit appellare permissus. The reader should read this sentence slowly. It contains three distinct juridical claims: first, that Rome has the right to loose what has been bound by any bishops’ sentences — that is, to undo a binding imposed anywhere else in the Catholic world; second, that she has the right to judge concerning the whole Church; and third, that no one is permitted to judge of her judgment — since the canons themselves have willed that appeals go to her from every part of the world, and from her no one may appeal. This is the earliest explicit formulation of what later canon law will formalize as prima sedes a nemine judicatur — “the First See is judged by none.” The principle runs through Gratian’s Decretum (C.9 q.3) and is invoked repeatedly in medieval decretal jurisprudence. But its locus classicus is here, in Gelasius’s letter to Dardania, written in plain answer to a practical question: may the Apostolic See act alone against Acacius? It is important to read Chapter VII in strict continuity with Chapter III. The canons to which Gelasius refers — almost certainly including the appellate provisions of Sardica (343/344) — are not the ground of Roman authority but its procedural codification. The ground was stated in Chapter III: the primacy Peter received from the Lord’s voice (Domini voce perceptum). What the canons do is enact, in concrete procedural form, what already follows from Peter’s reception of the primacy. Gelasius is not saying that a council gave Rome appellate jurisdiction; he is saying that the canons recognized the Petrine primacy by establishing its operational consequences. The distinction matters theologically: Roman authority does not rest on conciliar grant and could not be modified by a subsequent council, because what the canons confirm is not of the canons’ making. Gelasius answers, therefore, that the First See may and must act — because her authority, grounded in Peter, is not subject to synodal review.

One feature of the Acacian argument that deserves particular notice is Gelasius’s double reduction of Constantinople to “the parish of the Heraclean Church” — a phrase that appears in both Chapter VI and Chapter VII. The reader unfamiliar with the fourth- and fifth-century background may miss how sharp this is. The see of Byzantium had been a suffragan parish under the metropolitan of Heraclea in Thrace before Constantine made Byzantium his new capital in 330; Constantinople’s elevation above that original status was entirely a product of conciliar and imperial action — Canon 3 of Constantinople I (381), granting it “prerogative of honor after Rome because it is New Rome,” and Canon 28 of Chalcedon (451), granting it privileges equal to Rome’s. Neither canon was received at Rome. Leo refused Canon 28 explicitly and repeatedly; Canon 3 likewise never entered Roman ecclesiastical law — a fact Leo states directly in his Letter CVI to Anatolius (22 May 452), where he notes that the canons of Constantinople I had never been transmitted to Rome by Anatolius’s predecessors. The documentary point is decisive: Canon 3 had never entered Roman law in the first place, so the claim Anatolius was trying to build on it at Chalcedon had no canonical foundation on which to rest. Constantinople therefore has at Rome the standing it possessed before the unreceived elevations — a parish subordinate to Heraclea. This is not rhetorical bluster. It is the strict practical consequence of the principle that conciliar acts not received by the Apostolic See are not operative. The passage in Chapter VII is also, through its a fortiori structure, a strong positive assertion of Roman prerogative: if even a parish-priest-under-Heraclea could break a Roman sentence without synodal procedure (as the Acacian defense effectively conceded he had), how much more could the First See execute Chalcedon’s decrees by her own authority. The reader should hold this together with Chapter XI, where Gelasius cites Emperor Marcian, Anatolius of Constantinople himself, and Probus of Canusa as witnesses that the elevation attempted at Chalcedon was refused at the moment of its making. The Heraclea reductions in Chapters VI and VII state positively what Chapter XI shows historically: Constantinople’s attempted elevations above its original metropolitan structure never entered the canonical order the Apostolic See recognized.

Chapter VIII is equally significant, but it makes a different kind of claim: not about the theoretical structure of Roman authority but about its exercise in history. Gelasius argues that the Apostolic See has in fact acted without a preceding synod many times — sometimes to absolve those whom a synod had unjustly condemned, sometimes to condemn whom it was fitting to condemn when no synod was available. He gives a carefully chosen triad: Athanasius, condemned at the Eastern synod of Tyre (335), absolved by Pope Julius I; John Chrysostom, condemned at the Synod of the Oak (403) by a council of bishops who were themselves Catholic in faith, absolved by Pope Innocent I; Flavian of Constantinople, condemned at the “Robber Council” of Ephesus (449), absolved by Pope Leo. In each case, Rome acted alone, and in each case the whole Church afterward recognized Rome’s judgment as the right one. Then Gelasius adds the fourth case: Dioscorus, who had been received at the Robber Council of Ephesus — Rome alone, by Leo’s authority, condemned him, and for the truth alone decreed that the Synod of Chalcedon should be held. The reader will note that Rome’s decree came first; Chalcedon followed. The sentence that governs is Gelasius’s own: sicut id quod prima sedes non probaverat, constare non potuit, sic quod illa censuit judicandum, Ecclesia tota suscepit — “just as what the First See had not approved could not stand, so what she judged ought to be condemned, the whole Church received.” The principle is that Chalcedon confirmed what Rome had determined; it did not originate it.

Chapter X is the letter’s confrontation with the Constantinople argument. The Eutychian communicators had appealed to Acacius’s status as bishop of the royal city — as though residing in the imperial capital conferred ecclesiastical prerogative. Gelasius’s refutation has two layers. The first is historical and almost mocking: the emperor resided for long periods at Ravenna, Milan, Sirmium, Trier — did the bishops of those cities therefore claim greater dignities than their anciently allotted measure? The second is theoretical, and here Gelasius applies what he had already formulated more fully in his correspondence with Anastasius earlier in 494 (Letter VIII, Duo Sunt): alia potestas est regni sæcularis, alia ecclesiasticarum distributio dignitatum — “the power of the secular kingdom is one thing, the distribution of ecclesiastical dignities another.” The two orders are not parallel and do not translate into each other. A city’s rank in the imperial order is irrelevant to the rank of its bishop in the ecclesiastical order. The argument is structural, and it cuts off the imperial-capital claim at its root.

Chapter XI presents the evidentiary record. Gelasius cites three witnesses across multiple pontificates. Marcian, the Eastern emperor at Chalcedon, had intervened on behalf of Constantinople’s elevation — and had been rebuffed by Leo; and Marcian nonetheless praised Leo for his firmness, because, as Gelasius puts it, Leo had suffered by no reasoning the canons’ rules to be violated. Anatolius of Constantinople, Acacius’s own predecessor — who had presided over the Chalcedonian session that produced Canon 28 and had the most to gain from its acceptance — submitted himself to Leo in the correspondence around Leo’s Letter CXXXII (March 454), acknowledging that the whole matter had been reservata auctoritati vestrae beatitudinis, “reserved to the authority of your blessedness.” Probus of Canusa, Simplicius’s legate under Emperor Leo the Thracian (d. 474), refused again in the emperor’s presence more than a decade later. Canon 28 of Chalcedon never entered Roman law. The argument is cumulative: not a single act of Leonine firmness that could be re-opened by a later pope, but a continuing non-reception maintained across multiple pontificates, reaffirmed by the very bishop who stood most to gain from it, and ultimately commended even by the emperor who had pressed for it. When Gelasius reasserts this without qualification, he is not innovating; he is pointing to what the record already attests.

Chapter XII may be the most remarkable single paragraph in the whole corpus for the relation of ecclesiastical and secular power. Gelasius lays down the principle first — sacerdotali concilio de sacerdotibus judicia provenirent; non a sæculari viderentur qualescunque pontifices percelli (judgments concerning priests should proceed from a priestly council; bishops of whatever sort are not to be seen cast down by secular power) — and then illustrates it with a striking sequence of biblical and patristic precedents: Nathan rebuking David to his face; Ambrose excommunicating Theodosius the Elder; Leo reproving Theodosius the Younger over the Robber Council of Ephesus; Hilarus confronting Anthemius in the presence of St. Peter in Rome itself; Simplicius and Felix chiding Basiliscus and Zeno; and finally Gelasius’s own recent example — his refusal to yield to Odoacer when that Arian barbarian king, then holding Italy, demanded what ought not be done. The reader should note what Gelasius is doing with this list. He is establishing a continuity of prophetic and priestly resistance to overreaching royal power, stretching from Nathan through the fathers of the Western church and on into the living memory of his own pontificate. Acacius is measured against this pattern and found to have failed it: he could have resisted, he did resist when he wished (against Basiliscus, and against communicating openly with Peter the Fuller), but he chose not to resist when resistance would have cost him. The failure is moral, not structural — which makes the juridical consequence all the more evident.

One particularly telling phrase appears in the same chapter, almost in passing: Acacius should have referred these matters to the Apostolic See, a qua sibi curam illarum regionum noverat delegatam — “from which he knew the care of those regions had been delegated to him.” The reader who has read Leo’s Letters V and VI to Anastasius of Thessalonica will recognize the pattern. The bishop of the royal city — like the vicar of Illyricum, like any metropolitan serving a broader regional role — holds his broader care as a delegation from the Apostolic See, not by right of his own see. Acacius’s failure to refer matters back to Rome is accordingly not merely a pastoral lapse but a violation of the structural obligation imposed by the delegation itself. The Constantinopolitan bishop’s care for Eastern affairs was Rome’s care exercised at a distance; and when that distance obstructed, Rome did what she always did — she spoke directly, past the obstructing intermediary.

The closing chapters make clear what the Italian congregation of bishops had done and not done. They did not assemble as a new synod against Chalcedon; they assembled as participants in the execution of what Chalcedon had already established. The sentence against Acacius was in the name of the Apostolic Bishop alone (as was lawful to his power), communicated secretly for practical reasons; the Italian congregation recognized the sentence, did not originate it. The distinction matters because Gelasius is refusing to concede that a Roman sentence requires conciliar affirmation to be operative. The congregation participates in the sentence; the sentence does not derive its force from the congregation. The reader may compare the structural argument here with Leo’s Letter X, where the same distinction runs through the entire disposition of the Hilary-of-Arles affair: Rome decides, local assemblies either ratify or are themselves corrected by the decision.

Letter XIII is long, repetitive in places, and argumentative throughout. But its doctrinal yield is dense, and the principles it articulates — the Roman confirmation of synods, the right to loose and judge, the inappealability of the Roman judgment, the independence of the Apostolic See from secular coercion, the distinction of the two orders — will be the ground from which the medieval canonical tradition will build. For the reader who wishes to trace the continuity of the Roman primacy from the Leonine period through the Gelasian consolidation into the formal canon law of the centuries that followed, this letter is the pivot. The principles are not new with Gelasius — he reads them out of an established paternal tradition — but the explicit formulation here is his, and it is in this formulation that the later tradition received them.

The Early Church and Peter's Primacy